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C HAP T E R 16 
State and Local Taxation 
RICHARD A. COREN· 
§16.1. Personal Income Taxes-Decisional Law. In the Survey year 
two cases and one administrative ruling dealt with the interplay be-
tween the general comprehensive income tax statute of Massachusetts 
and its underlying state constitutional basis.1 Potential conflict arises 
in part because the Massachusetts income tax law is patterned closely 
after the Federal Internal Revenue Code,2 which of course is not re-
stricted by the Massachusetts constitution. Massachusetts income taxa-
tion is, however, subject to the state constitutional stricture that although 
"[s}uch tax may be at different rates upon income from different classes 
of property ... , [it must} be levied at a uniform rate . . . upon incomes 
derived from the same class of property." 3 
In Daley v. State Tax Commission,4 the Supreme Judicial Court found 
this constitutional principle to conflict with the clear and unambiguous 
Massachusetts code provisions concerning the taxation of a recipient of 
a lump sum distribution 5 from a qualified employee retirement plan. 
Upon his retirement in 1972, the taxpayer received from his employer's 
qualified employee retirement plan 6 a lump sum distribution of over 
• RICHARD A. COREN is in private practice in Boston. 
§16.1. 1 MASS. CONST. amend. XLIV. 
2 Since 1971, Massachusetts has had three tax codes each modeled upon the 
Internal Revenue Code applicable to a particular year. Chapter 555, § 5, of the 
Acts of 1971 inserted into C.L. c. 62, § l(c), the following definition: '''Code', 
The Internal Revenue Code of the United States, as amended on January the first, 
nineteen hundred and seventy one." ld. Acts of 1973, c. 723, revamped portions 
of C.L. c. 62 to conform the Massachusetts income tax more closely with the fed-
eral income tax but retained the 1971 definition of the Code. Acts of 1977, e. 
599, § 1, amended C.L. e. 62, § 1(c), to read "(e) 'Code' the Internal Revenue 
Code of the United States, as amended on May twenty-third, nineteen hundred 
and seventy-seven and in effect for the taxable year." See also Acts of 1979, c. 
408, § 1, updating the "Code" to the "Internal Revenue Code of the United States 
as amended on November sixth, nineteen hundred seventy-eight and in effect for 
the taxable year." The 1979 Code update is discussed infra. 
3 MASS. CbNST. amend. XLIV (emphasis added). 
4 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3149, 383 N.E.2d 1140 (1978). 
5 See I.R.C. § 402 (e) (4) (defining lump sum distribution). 
6 For federal definitions and treatment of qualified employee retirement plans, 
see generally I.R.C. §§ 401-415. 
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$50,000.00. The applicable federal code provision gave favorable treat-
ment to this deferred compensation by permitting a portion of the lump 
sum payment to be treated as a long term capital gain.7 Accordingly, 
the taxpayer divided this lump sum on his 1972 federal return into three 
reportable categories of receipt: (1) a nontaxable return of his own 
contribution, (2) an ordinary income portion, and ( 3 ) a long term 
capital gain portion. 8 On his Massachusetts return, however, the tax-
payer claimed that the entire taxable portion of the lump sum was 
compensation income subject to the five percent tax.9 The Commis-
sioner disagreed and assessed a further tax on the ground that the 
portion of the lump sum taxed federally as a long term capital gain 
should be taxed at the higher rate of nine percent.10 
The Commissioner's argument was based upon a straightforward 
reading of the Massachusetts income tax statute. The then applicable 
statute divided income into two categories, nine percent income and 
five percent income. The statute defined nine percent income to include 
interest (other than certain interest principally from Massachusetts 
banks), dividends, and "net capital gain." 11 The five percent category 
was a catchall, taxing "all other" income.12 In addition, the then ap-
plicable Massachusetts code defined net capital gain as including income 
to which federal law artificially grants favored long term capital gain 
status.1S Literally applied, the Massachusetts code would have taxed 
the '10ng term capital gain" portion of the retirement distribution at 
nine percent and the "ordinary income portion" at five percent. 
The Daley Court's decision to reject the Commissioner's interpretation 
of the Massachusetts income tax provision involved an examination of 
both the state constitution's taxing provision and the Federal Code's 
deferred compensation provision.14 As the Daley Court noted, article 
44 of the Articles of Amendment to the Massachusetts Constitution, the 
sole basis for imposition of a statewide income tax, requires a uniform 
rate of taxation on income from a single class of property. 111 The Court 
ruled that the lines drawn under the legislative power to create and 
define different classes of property must reflect "actual underlying 
differences in the property." 16 The Court noted the long unquestioned 
7 1.R.e. § 402(a)(2) (1972). 
s 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3150, 383 N.E.2d at 1141. 
9 Id. 
10Id. 
11 C.L. c. 62, § 4( a), as inserted by Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5. 
12 Id., § 4(b). 
IS Id., § 4(a)(3). 
14 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3151-55, 385 N.E.2d at 1142-44. 
111 MASS. CONST. amend. XLIV. 
16 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3154, 383 N.E.2d at 1143. 
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interpretation that "property" includes the right to contract for personal 
employment, thereby bringing the state constitutional tax restrictions in 
issue,17 The Daley Court examined the basis for the federal bifurcation 
of this deferred compensation into ordinary and capital gains income.18 
It noted that Congress had provided that in certain instances qualified 
lump sum retirement and death benefits would be taxed in part as capi-
tal gains and in part as ordinary income.19 For instance, amounts 
traceable to pre-1970 employer contributions and accumulations thereon 
were to be taxed federally at the favorable capital gains rate.20 The 
Daley Court held that incorporation of this federal chronological distinc-
tion into the Massachusetts tax code violated article 44, since there was 
no basis for finding the portion of the income attributable to pre-1970 
contributions generically different from that attributable to post-1969 
contributions.21 In short, the Court found that the entire lump sum 
payment was derived from one class of property, i.e., earned income, 
and that under the 1971 Code taxed entirely as five percent income.22 
Despite substantial revisions of both federal and Massachusetts tax 
laws since 1972,23 Daley remains significant. The Daley Court invited 
the legislature to amend the Massachusetts code when it noted that the 
retirement plan contributions in the article 44 property sense were clearly 
distinguishable from the interest or appreciation earned on such con-
tributions.24 Grasping this distinction between compensation income 
and investment income, the Department of Revenue issued Letter Ruling 
79-34.2l'i This ruling involved a lump sum distribution from the Massa-
17 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3154 n.11, 383 N.E.2d at 1143 n.11 (citing Raymer 
v. Tax Comm'r, 239 Mass. 410, 413, 132 N.E. 190, 192 (1921». 
18 Id. at 3152, 383 N.E.2d at 1143. See I.R.C. § 402. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. The maximum federal effective rate on capital gains, ignoring the mini-
mum tax, was then thirty-five percent. 
21 Id. at 3155, 383 N.E.2d at 1143-44. 
22 Id. In Massachusetts the converse holds true, and ordinary income, such as 
wages, is more favorably treated than capital gain income. 
23 The current Internal Revenue Code electively taxes a recipient of a qualified 
lump sum distribution at capital gains rates to the extent the payment is attributable 
to pre-1974 contributions. I.R.C. § 402(a)(2). The current Massachusetts code 
utilizes the federal definition of "net capital gain," and consequentlr' the ten per-
cent tax literally applies. G.L. c. 62, § l(k). The Department 0 Revenue now 
instructs taxpayers to treat such federal "capital gain income" as five percent in-
come. See instructions to 1979 Massachusetts Income Tax Form 1, page 6, item 
16( e). 
24 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3155, 383 N.E.2d at 1143-44. The payment in the 
Daley case consisted of employer contributions, employee contributions, and the 
appreciation or earnings on those contributions accumulated over the employee's 
years of participation in the plan. The unstated logic is apparent. The employer 
contributions so made are dearly compensation for services rendered, while the 
appreciation element accruing on such contributions, on the other hand, is in-
vestment income. 
25 (1979) STATE AND LOCAL TAX'N (MASS.) (P-H) 1f 58.074. 
3
Goren: Chapter 16: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§16.1 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 441 
chusetts Public Retirement System. Since contributions to that retire-
ment plan are taxable to the employee when made, only the appreciation 
on such contributions is taxable when distributed.26 This ruling, there-
fore, was not concerned with taxing the compensation element of the 
lump sum distribution and, unlike Daley, faced no article 44 issue.27 
The Department of Revenue focused on the distinction between earned 
and unearned income, and, after noting that such interest was not 
derived from a Massachusetts savings bank,28 ruled that the interest 
portion of the distribution should be taxed at the higher rate. 21l 
Letter Ruling 79-34 may anticipate administrative attempts to tax at 
ten percent the unearned portions of lump sum distributions from other 
similar retirement plans. A self-employed individual under the Keogh 
Plan or a retiree from an employer-maintained Individual Retirement 
Account or a Simplified Employee Pension Plan may soon see the in-
terest element 30 of his lump sum retirement payment taxed at this 
higher rate if the Department of Revenue extends the concept of Letter 
Ruling 79-34 to these situations. Since interest from Massachusetts 
banks is taxed at five percent,31 the question whether this noncompensa-
tory element of such lump sum retirement distributions is to be taxed 
at ten percent or five percent may turn on whether the trustee is a 
Massachusetts or foreign bank. 
Regardless of the identity and location of the trustee, it does not nec-
essarily follow that the taxable portion of a lump sum payment from a 
Keogh or IRA trust must be entirely subject to the ten percent income 
tax. Under section 11 of chapter 62, a Massachusetts resident receiving 
income from an untaxed foreign retirement trust 32 or from a Massachu-
setts trust which was not previously taxed under chapter 62 is taxed 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 C.L. c. 62, §§ 2(b)(1)(A), 4. 
29 Letter Ruling 79-34 (1979) STATE AND LOCAL TAX'N (MASS.) (P-H) W 58.074. 
30 The contributions to such plans are taxed by the commonwealth to the se1£-
employed or employee-participant in the taxable year when made, C.L. c. 62, 
§ 2 ( 7 ), ( 9 ) . Therefore, only the interest or appreciation element of the balance 
of such accounts will be subject to Massachusetts income tax when distributed in 
a lump sum payment. Consequently, the constitutional issue present in Daley is 
not raised. 
31 Interest from banks chartered by the commonwealth or from federal banks 
located within the commonwealth is taxed at a rate of 5%. C.L. c. 62, §§ 2(b) 
(1)(A),4. 
32 Nearly all federally qualified employee benefit plans utilize formal trust in-
struments. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§ 401, 401(a)(10)(b) (Keogh Plan trusts); I.R.C. 
§ 408(a) (IRA trusts); I.R.C. §§ 405, 409 (retirement bonds). Even the custodial 
accounts commonly utilized for Individual Retirement Accounts, which may lack 
formal trust attributes, seem unquestionably to create a fiduciary relationship be-
tween the bank or financial institution, on the one hand, and the participant and 
his beneficiaries on the other. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 408(h). 
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upon receipt.33 Section 11 further provides that trust income not previ-
ously subject to tax under chapter 62 will be taxed upon receipt by a 
Massachusetts resident beneficiary "according to the nature of the in-
come received by such [exempt] trustees .... " 34 Thus, if the distrib-
uted trust income consists partly of business income and partly of capi-
tal gains, the recipient beneficiary must bifurcate proportionately the 
distribution into five percent and ten percent income. 
So viewed, section 11 would seem to apply to Massachusetts residents 
who receive distributions from any qualified retirement benefit trust. 
In light of the Daley doctrine, qualified common law employee retire-
ment plan benefits, composed (at least in part) of previously untaxed 
compensation income (the employer contributions), cannot be subject 
to section 11 bifurcation. Since, however, the compensation element of 
IRA plan distributions and Keogh plan distributions to self-employed 
individuals has been previously taxed, no Daley constitutional problem 
presents itself. Section 11 would apply to the taxable interest portion 
of these retirement distributions. Since under section 11 the income 
must be traced and categorized, the practical task of tracing trust in-
come of an investment fund over a holding period spanning a working 
career of possibly forty or more years will certainly be difficult and in 
some instances impossible.3<i Neither the form nor the manner of the 
benefit payment would vitiate the tracing requirement.36 Annuity in-
come as a general matter is taxed at five percent. 37 If the terms of a 
trust require payment of an annuity to a beneficiary, section 11, if ap-
plicable, will tax the annuity to the Massachusetts beneficiary according 
33 C.L. c. 62, § 11. The Massachusetts scheme of taxation of income from 
trust property reaches incomes to the extent it benefits a Massachusetts resident 
beneficiary. Second Bank-State Street Trust Co. v. State Tax Comm'n, 337 Mass. 
203, 209, 148 N.E.2d 647, 651 (1958). If the income is received by a Massa-
chusetts trustee for the benefit of a Massachusetts beneficiary, it is taxed in the 
year accrued or received under section 10. Under the constructive receipt doctrine, 
such resident will also be taxed if the income is available to him at his option. 
ld. See also State Tax Comm'n v. Fitts, 340 Mass. 575, 578-80, 165 N.E.2d 586, 
589 (1960); I.R.C. § 72 (m)( 4) and (m)( 4)( A) (addressing constructive receipt 
of IRA and Keogh benefits, respectively). 
34 C.L. c. 62, § 11. 
3<i This reoord keeping is oomplicated by the different effective rates which 
current chapter 62 applies to different items such as Massachusetts bank interest 
(five percent) and other interest and dividends (ten percent), C.L. c. 62, § 2( b), 
and long term capital gains (ten percent after allowance of the federal capital gain 
deduction). ld., § 2(b), § 2(c)(3) as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 2. A 
Massachusetts capital gains deduction will be phased in over three years. Acts of 
1979, c. 409, § 5. See note 22, § 2 infra. 
36 Staples v. Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 305 Mass. 20, 24, 24 N.E.2d 641, 
642-43 (1940); Tirell v. Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 287 Mass. 464, 469, 192 
N.E. 77, 79 (1934). 
37 Annuity income is not "interest or dividend" inoome and clearly is not capital 
gain income. Accordingly, it would fall into the five percent catchall class of in-
come. C.L. c. 62, § 2(b)(2). 
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to the nature of the income received by the exempt trust.38 In addition, 
the section 11 tracing requirement may apply to pensions paid under 
the Massachusetts Public Retirement System,39 in essence a state retire-
ment trust.40 
The difficulties of the tracing requirement could be eliminated through 
the creation of another class of property under the legislature's article 
44 power. In the interests of simplicity and equity, this class could be 
designated as the "taxable portion" of all qualified retirement plans, 
including the compensatory contributions from qualified employee bene-
fit plans and the unearned investment portions of all plans. Since pay-
ment of the entire benefit regardless of its immediate source closely 
resembles deferred compensation,41 income from this class of property 
should be subject to the five percent tax. It should be noted, in particu-
lar, that creation of such a class avoids the article 44 issue which arises 
when one partner of a firm elects a lump sum payment from his Keogh 
plan subject at least in part to the ten percent tax, while another partner 
of the same firm elects to receive the same retirement benefit in the form 
of an annuity taxable at five percent.42 
In Turenne v. State Tax Commission,43 the Appellate Tax Board con-
sidered the interplay of article 44 and another Internal Revenue Code 
provision which artificially treated what would otherwise be a capital 
transaction as an ordinary income transaction. The Turenne case in-
volved losses on 1244 stock 44 which, under a provision of the Federal 
Code, are treated as ordinary losses rather than capital losses.46 The 
88 305 Mass. at 24, 24 N.E.2d at 640; 287 Mass. at 489, 192 N.E. 79. 
89 See generally C.L. c. 32. 
40 The state retirement system closely resembles a trust. The state treasurer is 
the custodian of the fund in what seems to be a fiduciary capacity. C.L. c. 32, 
§ 23( b). In addition, the retirement system requires diversification of investments 
between certain limited types of securities and Massachusetts savings deposits. Id., 
§ 23(d). 
41 Even Individual Retirement Accounts resemble deferred compensation. The 
contribution to the plan may be viewed as a percentage of earned income. The 
deferral is present in the sense that the percentage of earned income contributed 
is not available for use or consumption without penalty until the individual reaches 
age 59 and one half. I.R.C. § 408(f) (ten percent tax on the amount of dis-
tribution included in gross income). 
42 Daley v. State Tax Comm'n, 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 3153 n.9, 383 N.E.2d 
at 1143 n.9. 
43 (1979) STATE TAX RpTR. (MASS.) (CCH) 1f 200-533, at 10,563. 
44 I.R.G. § 1244. This special rule applies to losses incurred on the sale or 
other disposition of the common stock of certain "small business corporations" hav-
ing a total capitalization of one million dollars or less. Id. 
45 A federal long term capital loss has limited utility. After offsetting long 
term gains, the balance of such losses may be used to offset up to $3,000 of ordinary 
income per year on a two for one basis. I.R.C. § 1211. Thus it takes $6,000 of 
long term losses to offset $3,000 of ordinary income. Ordinary losses, on the other 
hand, offset income on a one for one basis. I.R.O. § 165. 
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taxpayer in Turenne claimed on his Massachusetts return that this recog-
nized security loss should offset his Massachusetts "ordinary" or five per-
cent income.4iJ The Board noted that the then applicable section of 
chapter 62 defined "capital loss" without regard to whether the federal 
code granted such capital transaction special ordinary income treat-
ment.47 The Board found for the Commissioner and held that such loss 
was a capital loss under Massachusetts law and hence deductible only 
against the taxpayer's ten percent income.48 The Board based its hold-
ing in part on its observation that since 1244 losses 
belong in the same class of losses as ordinary capital losses, they 
may not be subjected to taxation at a different rate than other capi-
tal losses. The fiction of a capital loss deemed to be an ordinary 
loss under the Code raises a serious question about a violation of 
the provisions of the 44th Amendment to the Massachusetts Con-
stitution.49 
Thus, the Board disallowed the taxpayer's deduction of his 1244 loss 
against ordinary income. 
While the Turenne decision has identified a constitutional issue of 
some significance, which will undoubtedly be raised again, the reach of 
the decision is unclear. . 
Recent amendments to the Massachusetts code 110 should reverse the 
Turenne holding. Chapters 408 and 409 of the Acts of 1979 have re-
placed the former statutory definitions of "capital loss," "capital gain," 
"net capital loss," and "net capital gain" with the federal Internal Rev-
enue Code definitions of such terms.lll Chapter 62, by virtue of its 
adoption of the federal definition of capital loss, now literally requires 
the deduction of a so-called 1244 loss against five percent income. With 
the deletion from chapter 62 of section 7 52 and subsection (K) of sec-
tion 1,118 a 1244 loss will not appear in the computation of ten percent 
income. Chapter 62 now provides that a loss incurred by a taxpayer in 
a transaction entered into for profit, such as most stock investments, is 
a deduction against part B, or five percent income, provided such loss 
is not a federally defined "capital loss." 54 Section 1244 losses, which 
46 (1979) STATE TAX RPm. (MASS.) (CCH) 1f 200-533, at 10,569. 
47 Id. at 10,571. 
48 Id. at 10,572. 
49 Id. (emphasis added). 
110 G.L. c. 62, § I, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 408, 409. See text, § 2 Infra 
at notes 21-23. 
61Id. 
62 Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 4. 
68 Id., § 1. 
64 G.L. c. 62, § 3B. I.R.C. § 165(£) provides that '1Osses from sales or ex-
changes of capital assets shall be allowed only to the extent allowed in sections 1211 
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are ordinary losses for federal purposes, must then be deductible against 
five percent income. 
The Department of Revenue may cite the Daley case and permit 1244 
losses as deductions only against ten percent income. It would argue 
that chapter 62 cannot be literally applied to the extent that it directs 
what the Appellate Tax Board in Turenne suggested may be called the 
constitutionally impermissible melding of unearned investment losses 
with earned income. This argument is fallacious. The Board in Turenne 
erroneously referred to losses as subject to taxation, thereby implying 
that losses are income.55 Income, however, is not and never has been 
per se synonymous with gross receipts. 56 The Massachusetts income tax 
under article 44 does not tax capital but only the income or profit made 
on that capital. 57 Although article 44 requires a uniform rate of tax to 
be applied to income from a single class of property, it does not also 
require that legislatively created deductions must apply solely to the 
income from a single class of property. In fact, the statute in one in-
stance permits certain business deductions to be used as an offset against 
both five and ten percent income.58 This right of offset permitting 
deduction of operating business losses against unearned income related 
to the operation of such business is contrary to the suggestion made by 
the Board in Turenne. The propriety of such crossover deductions, how-
ever, seems beyond reproach.59 Thus, a deduction against five per-
cent income for those investment losses, which, for federal purposes, 
are "ordinary" rather than "capital," is well within the power of the 
legislature. 60 Therefore, the statute properly may be literally applied, 
and 1244 losses as well as other losses labeled by the Internal Revenue 
Code as "ordinary" may be deducted against five percent income. 
§16.2. Personal Income Taxes-Legislation. In 1979 the legislature 
made several revisions to the state personal income tax statute. Chapter 
408 of the Acts of 1979, the most significant of the legislative changes, 
prOvided that for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1979, 
and 1212." In most instances stock in a corporation qualifies as capital asset. ld., 
§ 1221. But § 1244 ( a), to the extent the tests of the entire section are met, over-
rides such classification and mandates ordinary loss treatment. 
55 (1979) STATE TAX RPTR. (MASS.) (CCH) ~ 200-533, at 10,572. 
56 Gross receipts may include, for example, a recovery of capital. In other words, 
there must be an economic gain for there to be income. See, e.g., Eisner v. 
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 207 (1920); Dow Chemical Co. v. Commissioner of 
Revenue, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1479, 1502, 391 N.E.2d 253, 264 (1979). 
57 Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 368 Mass. 242, 249, 331 N.E.2d 795, 797 
( 1975). 
58 G.L. c. 62, § 2(0)(1). See also Druker v. State Tax Comm'n, 374 Mass. 198, 
372 N.E.2d 208 (1978). 
59 See Druker v. State Tax Comm'n, 374 Mass. 198, 372 N.E.2d 208 (1978). 
60 See Barnes v. State Tax Comm'n, 363 Mass. 589, 296 N.E.2d 510 (1973). 
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references to the Internal Revenue Code should be to the Code as 
amended on November 6, 1978, and in effect for the "taxable year.1 Since 
Massachusetts gross income takes as its starting point federal gross in-
come,2 the 1978 Revenue Act's new gross income exclusions should be 
noted. Among·. the notable features of the 1978 Act is the one-time 
$1<lq,000 gain exclusion from the sale of one's principal residence.3 This 
exclusion permits a (1) taxpayer at least fifty-five years old, (2) who 
has owned and occupied a house as his principal residence for three 
out of the five years immediately preceding its sale, (3) to exclude the 
gain realized from such sale up to a maximum of $100,000 from his 
gross income, (4) provided the closing occurs on or after January 1, 
1979.4 Any gain realized over $100,000 will be recognized and taxed 
as capital gain.5 In addition, gain in excess of $100,000 remains eligible 
for the general nonrecognition rollover available where a new principal 
residence is purchased within the usual eighteen month period.s 
The Code update effective for taxable years beginning on or after 
January 1, 1979, is not frozen into place. The legislature adopted the 
Internal Revenue Code as amended by the 1978 Revenue Act but only 
to the extent that such code is in effect for the particular taxable year.7 
This provision will almost certainly cause some very difficult interpretive 
problems. Since the Massachusetts statute incorporates by reference 
the federal code as it existed on November 6, 1978, and in effect for the 
taxable year,S if any portion of the 1978 Code is later changed by Con-
gress, the provision as altered will not be a part of the Massachusetts 
code because it did not exist as a part of the federal code in November 
§16.2. 1 Acts of 1979, c. 408, § 1. The reference date of the adopted code 
is the date of the enactment of the Revenue Act of 1978. Pub. L. No. 95-600 
[hereinafter cited as. the 1978 Revenue Act}. 
2 G.L. c. 62, § 2(a). 
3 I.R.C. § 121, as amended by 1978 Revenue Act § 404. 
4 ld. 
5 ld. Several technical rules concerning the availability of the e",clusion in-
clude: (1) spouses owning a residence as joint tenants or as tenants by the. entirety 
may use the exclusion if one of them satisfies the age, holding, and use requirements; 
(2) a taxpayer may use the exclusion only once in his lifetime; (3) neither spouse 
taking the exclusion may take a subsequent exclusion if later widowed or divorced. 
Taxpayers who have utilized the one-time $35,000 gain exclusion previously avail-
able to individuals sixty-five or older are nonetheless eligible for this new exclusion, 
provided that the first election was with respect to a transaction occurring on or 
before July 26, 1978. I.R.C. § 121 (b)( 3). See also Joint Comro. on Internal 
Revenue Tax, General Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1978, 96th Cong., 1st 
Sess. (1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Committee Report]. 
6 I.R.C. § 1034; JOint Committee Report, supra note 5, at 257. 
7 Acts of 1979, c. 408, § 1 (emphasis added). This provision should be com-
pared with the Massaohusetts Estate Tax, which adopted the federal code as 
amended and in eHect on January 1, 1975. G.L. c. 65c, § lea). 
8 Acts of 1979, c. 408, § 1. 
9
Goren: Chapter 16: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§16.2 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 447 
1978. Moreover, the old provision would no longer be part of the 
Massachusetts code since, although it did exist as a part of the November 
1978 Code, it would not be in effect for the taxable year in which the 
federal change became effective. Any significant congressional amend-
ment to the 1978 Code may leave a gaping hole in the Massachusetts 
income tax statute, which would inevitably result in confusion and 
litigation. 
The pattern of Massachusetts personal income tax legislation in the 
last decade is instructive. Prior to 1971, there existed no direct relation-
ship between the then limited reach of the Massachusetts income tax 
and the broad all-encompassing federal income tax.9 In 1971, the leg-
islature adopted a comprehensive income tax modeled after the federal 
code.10 Both the 1971 11 and the 1973 12 legislation incorporated the 
Internal Revenue Code as it was amended on January 1, 1971. As 
adopted by the Massachusetts legislature in these years, the present 
problem was avoided since all provisions of the 1971 Federal Code were 
incorporated into the Massachusetts code irrespective of whether these 
federal provisions were in effect in any later year. In 1977 the legisla-
ture first added the conjunctive definitional feature by incorporated the 
federal code as amended on May 23, 1977, and in effect for the taxable 
year.13 It is likely that by utilizing the conjunctive definition of the 
"code" the legislature in 1977 and 1979 sought to avoid potentially dif-
ficult interpretive questions arising from incorporating portions of the 
federal code that were not for federal purposes immediately effective.14 
In addition, the periodic Massachusetts revisions incorporating more 
recent federal code provisions also evidence legislative intent to attain 
as much uniformity as is practicable between the state and federal 
codesYi 
9 Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 368 Mass. 242, 243-45, 331 N.E.2d 795, 796 
(1975). 
10 Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5; 368 Mass. at 247, 331 N.E.2d at 796. 
11 Acts of 1971, c. 555, § 5. 
12 Acts of 1973, c. 723, § 2. 
13 Acts of 1977, c. 599, § 1. 
14 Both the 1978 Revenue Act and the 1977 Tax Reduction and Simplification Act, 
Pub. L. 95-30, 91 Stat. 126, delayed the implementation of several provisions in-
serted into the federal code either by prior legislation or by the two acts themselves. 
Some such provisions include: (1) the carryover basis rules for testamentary trans-
fers, 1978 Revenue Act § 515; (2) the employee educational assistance exclusion, 
1978 Revenue Act § 164; (3) the revised "at risk" rules of I.R.C. § 465, 1978 
Revenue Act §§ 202-04; and (4) the revised medical reimbursement exclusion, 1978 
Revenue Act § 366. 
15 Ct. Dow Chemical Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1479, 
1490, 391 N.E.2d 253, 258. Ironically, the Dow Court cited as one example of 
the legislatively desired uniformity, subsection (k) of section 1 of c. 62, which 
itself was struck from c. 62 later that year by Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 1. rd.. at 
1490 n.ll, 391 N.E.2d at 258 n.ll. 
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If, as this pattern suggests, the Massachusetts legislature intended, 
through the conjunctive phrasing of the effective dates, to incorporate 
the various delayed provisions of the 1978 Code into state law only as 
they became federally effective, it should have stated this intention more 
clearly. The state legislature must resolve this problem before Congress 
re-amends the Internal Revenue Code, as it inevitably will. If total 
uniformity (subject only to article 44 considerations) is desired, the 
legislature should simply adopt the federal code as it may from time 
to time be amended and in effect. to 
Chapter 409 of the Acts of 1979, enacted the same day as chapter 408, 
also made several significant changes in income taxation.17 Section 3 
of this chapter increased the dollar amount of exemptions reducing five 
percent income. The blindness exemption, both individual and spousal, 
was increased two hundred dollars to a total of $2,200.18 The age sixty-
five exemption, both individual and spousal, and the dependency exemp-
tion were increased one hundred dollars to a total of seven hundred 
dollars each.19 In addition, in the case of a husband and wife filing a 
joint return the additional exemption for the spouse whose earned in-
come is $2,000 or less, will be equal to $700.00 for 1979 and $800.00 
thereafter.20 
In addition to increasing the amounts of exemptions, chapter 409 
substantially changed Massachusetts capital gains taxation. Section 2 
of this chapter prOVided for the adoption of the federal capital gains 
deduction as an adjustment to gross ten percent income. 21 The current 
federal deduction of sixty percent of the net capital gain is to be phased 
in over three taxable years commencing in 1980.22 Sections 1 and 4 of 
this chapter also deleted two significant definitional provisions from the 
income tax statute concerning capital gains, namely subsection (K) of 
section 1 defining the terms "capital gain," "capital loss," "net capital 
loss," and "net capital gain," and section 7, defining "basis." 23 Thus, for 
taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1980, Massachusetts tax-
16 Notwithstanding concerns about improper delegation of state power to the 
federal government, the income portion of the corporate excise tax is so worded. 
C.L. c. 63, § 30, 5(a) (gross income) and 5(b) (allowable deductions). 
17 Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 7. This chapter is effective for years commencing 
on or after January 1, 1979. Id. 
18 C.L. c. 62, § 3B(b), as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 3. 
19 Id. 
20 Id. Regardless of the taxable lear, the exemption for spouses under C.L. o. 
62, § 3B(b)(2)(A) shall not excee $4,600. 
21 Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 2. 
22 Id., § 5. For taxable years beginning in 1980 the deduction will be equal to 
twenty percent of the net capital gain; for taxable years beginning in 1981, the 
deduction will be forty percent; and thereafter the deduction will be equal to the 
full sixty percent of the net capital gain. Id. 
23 Acts of 1979, c. 409, § 7. 
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payers apparently will be required to apply their federal basis for Massa-
chusetts tax purposes. 
These definitional changes may result in some initial inequity. Since 
Massachusetts taxation, particularly prior to 1971, had differed signifi-
cantly from federal taxation,24 it is not surprising that many taxpayers 
had a Massachusetts basis different from their federal basis in the same 
property. Consequently, these definitional changes will have the in-
equitable effect of creating a windfall for some taxpayers and additional 
tax burdens for others. For example, a Massachusetts taxpayer who 
sells rental real estate held since before 1971 suffers the burden of an 
increased Massachusetts tax since his federal (and his new Massachu-
setts) basis is lower than his formerly defined Massachusetts basis. This 
effect results from the fact that, since income from such realty was not 
taxed by the commonwealth before 1971, no depreciation reduced the 
pre-1971 Massachusetts basis of the property. On the other hand, a 
taxpayer who acquires property by gift may receive a small windfall, 
because the donee's initial federal basis will be increased by a portion 
of the federal gift tax paid by the donor.25 Since Massachusetts has no 
gift tax, section 7 of Chapter 62 had adjusted the donee's initial Massa-
chusetts basis by eliminating the federal gift tax adjustment.26 By con-
trast, this same donee will use his federal initial basis for both federal 
and Massachusetts purposes, and on a profitable sale of the gift, property 
will have a windfall equal to five or ten percent 27 of the gift tax basis 
adjustment. 
Another federal income tax provision incorporated into Massachusetts 
tax law by the Acts of 1979 changed the taxation of unemployment 
benefits.28 The November 1978 Internal Revenue Code provides that, 
for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1979, a certain portion 
of public unemployment benefits will be subject to federal tax.29 There-
24 See Ingraham v. State Tax Comm'n, 368 Mass. 242, 331 N.E.2d 795 (1975). 
25 I.R.C. § 1015(d)(6). 
26 C.L. c. 62, § 7(c)(2)(A). 
27 The actual percentages are 5.375 percent and 10.75 percent when the seven 
and one half percent surtax is computed. At first glance, chapter 409 seemed to 
have required Massachusetts to incorporate the new federal carryover basis rules for 
property acquired from a decedent. The federal carryover basis rule, however, 
never went into effect and was repealed in. 1980. Pub. L. 96-223, § 401(a). Since 
the state act incorporated only the portion of the November 1978 Code then in 
effect, carryover basis with respect to property acquired from decedents never was 
implemented in Massachusetts. 
28 C.L. c. 151A, § 22, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 746. 
29 I.R.C. § 85, as amended by the 1978 Revenue Act § 112(a). This provision 
requires a married taxpayer filing a joint return and having "total income" in excess 
of $25,000 to include the lesser of one half of such excess or the unemployment 
compensation itself in his taxable income. I.R.C. § 85( b). "Total income" is 
defined as the adjusted gross inoome plus all public unemployment compensation 
and non-taxable disability payments. Id. § 85(0). 
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fore, the revised chapter 62 requires that the federally taxable portion 
of unemployment compensation be included in Massachusetts gross in-
come.30 The Massachusetts Unemployment Compensation Statute, how-
ever, has long provided that "such benefits shall not be taxable under 
any provision of Chapter 62." 31 The legislature resolved this conflict 
through the enactment of chapter 746 of the Acts of 1979, which repealed 
that section of the unemployment compensation law which had ex-
empted these benefits from taxation.32 The Department of Revenue, 
by means of an unusual statutory construction, ruled that such benefits 
paid in 1979, to the extent taxable federally, will also be taxed by Massa-
chusetts.83 
Conservation-minded taxpayers may benefit from another provision 
of the Acts of 1979, the energy credit.34 For the five year period begin-
ning January 1, 1979, chapter 796 of the Acts of 1979 will permit the 
owner-occupant of residential property, who occupies this property as 
his principal residence, to take a tax credit for purchases of "renewable 
energy source property." 35 The amount of the credit equals thirty-five 
percent of the "net expenditure" for "renewable energy source property," 
subject to a maximum $1000 credit.36 The definition of "renewable energy 
source property," similar but not identical to its federal counterpart,87 
specifies that when such property is installed in the dwelling it (1) must 
transmit or use solar or wind energy to produce electricity or to heat, 
cool, or provide hot water, and (2) must have an estimated useful life 
of at least five years.a8 In addition, the taxpayer must be the original 
30 C.L. c. 62, § 2(a). 
31 C.L. c. ISlA, § 22. This exclusion of such benefits from income taxation 
has existed since 1945. Acts of 1945, c. 625, § 2. 
32 Acts of 1979, c. 746. Since chapter 746 had been enacted without emergency 
preamble, the legislative repeal of the specific exclusion was not effective until 90 
days later. Thus, for taxable years ending on December 31, 1979, the specific ex-
clusion remained effective. General prinCiples of statutory construction teach that 
where there is a conflict between two statutes, the specific statute, such as C.L. c. 
ISlA, § 22, takes precedence over the general code update, such as c. 408 of the 
Acts of 1979. 
38 See instructions to 1979 Massachusetts Income Tax, Form 1, page 6. 
84 C.L. c. 62, § 6( d), added by Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 9. 
311 [d. 
36 C.L. c. 62, § 6(d). 
37 Compare I.R.C. 44C(c). The Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980 
provides a higher and broader credit for residential renewable energy source ex-
penditures. The maximum credit starting with 1980 expenditures is increased to 
$4,000 from $2,000. In addition, the definition of qualifying equipment is expanded 
to include solar and geothermal equipment utilized to provide electricity. [d., as 
amended by the Crude Oil Windfall Profit Tax Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-223, 
§§ 202(a), (b), (c) and (d), 94 Stat. 229. 
38 C.L. c. 62, § 6( d) (I). Regulations construe this legislation as creating a 
one-tiMe-only credit per principal residence. Therefore, each time a taxpayer moves 
and acquires a new principal residence during ,the five year life of the statute, he 
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user of the property.39 Care must be taken in using the Massachusetts 
energy credit, since the coverage of the federal and state credits is not 
identical. The federal energy credit covers both "energy conservation 
expenditures" and "expenditures" for "renewable energy source prop-
erty." 40 The Massachusetts credit applies only to "renewable energy 
source property" 41 and thus is not available for insulation, storm door 
and windows, caulking, and other energy savings expenditures. 
In addition to the energy tax credit, the Massachusetts legislature has 
attempted to create a tax incentive for energy conservation through the 
creation of a new class of tax exempt income for Massachusetts inven-
tors of patents useful for "energy conservation" or for "alternative energy 
development." 42 Qualification for this tax benefit requires the inventor 
to obtain certification from the newly created Department of Energy 
Resources.43 Once certification is obtained two classes of individuals 
qualify for the special tax advantage. First, the inventor or other holder 
of the certified patent may for a limited time receive free of Massachu-
setts tax any income, including royalty income, "received from the sale, 
lease or other transfer of" the patent.44 Second, persons other than the 
inventor or patent holder may benefit from the exemption, although the 
operative taxing provision is capable of various interpretations. The 
exemption from state tax includes "any income received from the sale, 
lease, or other transfer of tangible, intangible, personal or real property 
or materials manufactured in the Commonwealth subject to such pat-
ent." 45 This definition would certainly seem to include income received 
by a licensor from the sale of materials manufactured in Massachusetts 
subject to the patent. It is less certain, however, whether income re-
ceived by a Massachusetts resident from a lease or sale of property sub-
ject to such a patent qualifies for the exclusion if the lease or sale takes 
or she will be eligible for successive $1,000 maximum credits for qualified expendi-
tures made with respect to each successive principal residence. 830 C.M.R. 62.50. 
39 C.L. c. 62, § 6(d). 
40 I.R.C. § 44C. 
41 C.L. c. 62, § 6(d). 
42 C.L. c. 62, § 2 ( a) (2)( C ), added by Acts of 1979 c. 796, § 8. The exemption 
becomes effective for taxable years beginning on or after January 1, 1980. 
43 Acts of 1979, c. 79,6, § 8. The secretary of that department has discretion 
to approve United States patents which either have been issued to or applied for 
by Massachusetts residents provided the patent was issued as "useful for energy 
conservation and related purposes or as useful for alternative energy development 
and related purposes." C.L. c. 62, § 2(a)(2)(C). As an additional condition to 
the. patent certification the Secretary of Energy Resources must find that the patent 
is of "economic value, practicable, and necessary for the convenience and welfare 
of the Commonwealth and its citizens." Id. 
44 G.L. c. 62, § 2(a) (2) (G). Since some of this income may be capital gain 
for federal tax purposes, the federal "net capital gain" may require adjustment be-
fore incorporation into the 10% income computation. See text at notes 21-23, supra. 
45 G.L. c. 62, § 2(a)(2)(C). 
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place in another jurisdiction. It is unclear whether the words "in the 
Commonwealth" qualify "sale, lease, or other transfer" as well as the 
word "manufactured." Answers to these questions depend upon au-
thoritative interpretation of the statutory language. Regulations would 
prove useful guidance in this area.46 
§16.3. Corporate Income Tax-Decisional Law. Two cases 1 de-
cided during the Survey year involving large multistate foreign public 
corporations are of particular interest. Massachusetts corporate excise 
tax law requires that foreign corporations pay an income tax to the 
extent that income is "derived from business carried on in the common-
wealth." 2 The corporate income tax is assessed by means of an alloca-
tion and apportionment formula utilizing property, payroll, and sales 
ratios of local to worldwide applied to the Massachusetts taxable net 
income.s Computation of tax starts with Massachusetts gross income, 
a term based on the federal definition of gross income.4 Net income is 
then determined by subtracting from the gross income most deductions 
allowed by federal law. 5 From this net income additional Massachusetts 
deductions, including "dividends" to the extent included in income, are 
subtracted.6 
In Dow Chemical Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue,7 the Supreme Ju-
dicial Court considered whether an allocation for state tax purposes 
should be made of certain income from a controlled foreign company 
"deemed" to be taxable to a United States resident under subpart F of 
the Internal Revenue Code. S This issue arose primarily because such 
"deemed" income is a tax fiction implemented for federal tax purposes.9 
46 However construed, the exclusion from gross income is limited in duration to 
five years "from the date of issuance of the United States patent or the date of 
approval by the Secretary of Energy Resources, whichever first expires." Id. 
§16.3. 1 W. R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
1927, 393 N.E.2d 330; Dow Chern. Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1979 Mass. 
Adv. Sh. 1479, 391 N.E.2d 253. 
2 G.L. c. 63, § 38. 
SId. The statute also provides that where the statutory formula fails to reflect 
accurately income derived from Massachusetts, a taxpayer may apply to the Com-
missioner to use another method. G.L. c. 63, § 42. 
4 Id., § 30, 5(a). 
II Id., § 30, 5(b). 
6 G.L. c. 63, § 38(a)( 1). 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1479, 391 N.E.2d 253 (1979). 
SId. at 1481, 393 N.E.2d at 254. See I.R.C. §§ 951-964. 
9 Subpart F was enacted by Congress in 1962 to limit the advantage American 
taxpayers formerly enjoyed by utilizing a foreign corporation to conduct their foreign 
business affairs and thereby leave the profits untaxed by the United States until 
brought back onshore. B. BrITKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF 
CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS, ~ 17-30 (4th ed. 1979). The Subpart F rules 
are addressed to a "controlled foreign corporation," which is defined as a foreign 
15
Goren: Chapter 16: State and Local Taxation
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1979
§16.3 STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION 453 
In the context of this chapter, it suffices to note that subpart F income 
is artificially created income, designed to prevent certain abuses in the 
deferral of domestic taxation. 
On its 1969 federal income tax return, Dow included over eight mil-
lion dollars as subpart F income realized by its foreign subsidiaries.1o 
In that year Dow had received over six million dollars of dividends from 
these foreign subsidiaries, but Dow properly did not include these 
dividends as income, because they were subsumed within the eight mil-
lion dollars of deemed subpart F income. ll Dow also received in that 
year, from the same subsidiaries, over three million dollars in dividends 
which it also properly excluded from its federal gross income, since the 
dividends had been in previous years included in gross income as 
deemed subpart F income. 12 Dow included in its federal gross income 
for that year the foreign tax gross-up amounting to over $400,000,13 
representing the foreign taxes paid or deemed paid by its subsidiaries 
on subpart F income.14 
On its Massachusetts corporate excise return for the year, Dow in-
cluded in Massachusetts gross income the subpart F income and the 
so-called foreign tax gross-up.15 The dispute arose over the inclusion 
of these items in Massachusetts gross income and over the "dividends" 
deductions taken by Dow with respect to these items. To calculate 
Massachusetts taxable net income, Dow deducted as dividends the sub-
part F income, the foreign tax gross-up, and the three million dollars of 
dividends actually received in the taxable year but reported to the 
commonwealth in previous years as subpart F income.16 The Commis-
sioner disallowed all three dividend deductions,17 Both the State Tax 
Commission and the Appellate Tax Board upheld the Commissioner.18 
corporation more than fifty percent of whose total combined voting power is owned 
directly and indirectly by a limited number of United States shareholders. I.R.G. 
§ 957 (a). The rules require each United States shareholder who owns directly 
or indirectly ten percent or more of the controlled foreign corporation to report as 
income his or its pro rata share of the undistributed Subpart F income of the 
foreign corporation. I.R.C. § 951. The definition of Subpart F income is highly 
complex. See BITTKER & EUSTICE, supra note 9, at If 17.32. 
10 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480, 391 N.E.2d at 254. 
11 ld. 
12 ld. 
13 ld. 
14 I.R.C. § 78. Essentially, the amount of this tax is included in the gross in-
come of those domestic corporations who take the foreign tax credit. Incfusion of 
this grossed-up tax as dividend income permits proper calculations of the foreign 
tax credit. 
15 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1480, 391 N.E.2d at 254. 
16 ld. 
171d. 
18 ld. at 1481, 391 N.E.2d at 254. 
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On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court rejected Dow's initial conten-
tion that neither the subpart F income nor the foreign tax gross-up was 
gross income for Massachusetts purposes. lO Dow noted that in the year 
in which subpart F income is reported, Dow may not in fact have re-
ceived this income.2o It argued, therefore, that since it received no 
economic benefit, therefrom, it could not be required to include the 
subpart F income in Massachusetts gross income. 21 The Court dismissed 
this argument on the basis that the plain language of the state statute 
defined Massachusetts gross income as federal gross income.22 The 
Court observed that "there is no obstacle to the Legislature'S treating 
the earned income of a foreign corporation as income taxable to its 
domestic parent, even if the parent chooses not to have that income 
distributed in the taxable year." 23 Thus, it ruled that subpart F income 
must be included within Massachusetts gross income.24 
Having concluded that subpart F income must be included in Massa-
chusetts gross income, the Court then rejected the Commissioner's con-
tention that Subpart F income was a "dividend" for purposes of deter-
mining gross income, but not for deduction purposes.25 The Commis-
sioner argued that the dividend deduction provided by chapter 63, sec-
tion 38, did not extend to "deemed" distributions, even though such 
distributions were treated as income.26 The Court noted that the statute 
makes no distinction among certain dividends, deemed or otherwise, 
domestic or foreign.27 Instead, the statutory language straightforwardly 
provides that dividends included in net income shall be deducted to 
obtain taxable net income.28 The Court noted that a deduction in this 
context was required to prevent the possibility of triple taxation.29 The 
Court found it clear that the state corporate excise is designed to per-
19 Id. at 1481, 391 N.E.2d at 254-55. 
20 Id. at 1490, 391 N.E.2d at 258. 
21 Id. The Court also noted that the domestic parent's control over the sub-
sidiary was equivalent to constructive receipt of sorts of the subSidiary's undistributed 
income. Id. at 1497 n.17, 391 N.E.2d at 267 n.17. 
22 Id. at 1490, 391 N.E.2d at 258. See C.L. c. 63, § 30, 5(a). There are 
some modifications to the federal definition of gross income not pertinent to this 
discussion. 
23 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1482, 391 N.E.2d at 255. 
24Id. 
21> Id. at 1499, 391 N.E.2d at 262-63. 
26 Id. at 1493, 391 N.E.2d at 260. 
27 Id. at 1494, 391 N.E.2d at 260. 
28 C.L. c. 63, § 38(a)(1). 
29 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1495, 391 N.E.2d at 260. The Commissioner had 
argued that the Subpart F income was only subject to tax twice because neither 
the federal nor the Massachusetts Code taxed foreign subsidiaries on their income. 
Id. The Court remarked that such analysis simply ignores the fact that the foreign 
subsidiaries are subject to tax in the oountries in which they do business or are 
incorporated. Id. 
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fonn the same general functions as the foreign tax credit in the federal 
code.30 Thus, the Court concluded that if it were to adopt the Com-
missioner's position, both the "symmetry" between the Massachusetts 
and federal systems, and the statutory purpose of the dividend deduc-
tion would be destroyed.3! In this regard, the Court stated: 
If a deduction for Subpart F income were to be disallowed, the 
consequence would be to prohibit a deduction for that income even 
when distributed. For dividends actually received-but excluded 
from net income because comprised in Subpart F income reported 
in current or previous years-are not included in Federal income, 
thus also excluded from State income, and hence could not be 
deducted therefrom.32 
Thus, the Court concluded that disallowance of the deduction would 
simply reinstate the multiple taxation that the state scheme sought to 
eliminate.33 
Notwithstanding its conclusion that subpart F income should be 
deductible as a dividend under state law, the Court ruled that the 
Commissioner properly disallowed the deduction in this instance.34 It 
noted that chapter 63, section 38 ( a)( 1 ), penn its a dividend deduction 
to be taken only in the year in which the dividends are reported in 
income. 35 The three million dollar dividend deduction sought by Dow 
was in reference to subpart F income reported in a prior tax year.36 
Therefore, the Court concluded, the deduction could not be taken in 
this later year.37 
The foreign tax gross-up presented a more serious theoretical prob-
lem for the Court. For federal purposes, a portion of the taxes paid 
or deemed paid by the controlled foreign subsidiary must be included 
"as a dividend" in the subpart F gross income of the domestic taxpayer.38 
This fictional income is then offset by a credit for the foreign taxes 
deemed paid.39 Dow argued that the foreign tax gross-up was only an 
arithmetic procedure and could not be included in its state income with-
out the offsetting credit.40 The Commissioner maintained that the fed-
eral tax gross-up and credit reduced the taxpayer's federal tax otherwise 
30 ld. at 1495, 391 N.E.2d at 261. 
31 ld. at 1495-96, 391 N.E.2d at 261. 
32 ld. at 1497-98, 391 N.E.2d at 262. 
88 ld. at 1498, 391 N.E.2d at 262. 
84 ld. at 1508, 391 N.E.2d at 266. 
MId. 
861d. 
871d. 
38 I.R.C. § 78. 
39 I.R.C. § 960. 
40 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1502-03, 391 N.E.2d at 264. 
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payable and confered upon Dow an obvious economic benefit, which 
may be treated as Massachusetts income.41 In rejecting the disturbing 
implication of the Commissioner's suggestion that the various federal 
tax credits could each be construed as creating an economic benefit 
equivalent to income, the Court summarily concluded that "such reduc-
tions [in federal tax liability] do not comform to conceptions of taxable 
income." 42 Clearly troubled by the concept of treating the foreign tax 
gross-up as income for Massachusetts purposes, the Court nevertheless 
felt compelled to adhere to a literal reading of the statute.43 The cor-
porate excise statute, it noted, adopts the federal definition of gross 
income, which included the gross-up.44 Since the gross-up is treated as 
a dividend deemed received by the domestic corporation from its foreign 
subsidiary, the Court concluded that the dividend characterization must 
hold true for state law purposes.45 Hence, the Court held, the gross-up 
is deductible from state income as a dividend.46 
The Dow case will undoubtedly figure prominently in future corporate 
tax litigation. Using Dow as precedent, any item of income which is 
treated as dividend income must be eligible for the dividend deduction 
of chapter 63, section 38 ( a) ( 1). The Commissioner, on the other hand, 
doubtlessly will argue that Dow must be limited to its facts. The cor-
porate excise tax statute does not define dividend.47 Therefore, the 
Commissioner probably will maintain that not all deemed or actual 
dividends included in Massachusetts net income are allowed an off-
setting deduction as a dividend under section 38 ( a ) ( 1 ). 
In W. R. Grace & Co. v. Commissioner of Revenue,48 another case 
dealing with the corporate income apportionment statute, the Supreme 
Judicial Court considered whether a foreign parent doing business in 
the commonwealth had realized income "derived from business carried 
on within the commonwealth" when it sold its majority stock interest 
in another corporation having no base of operations in Massachusetts.49 
In 1969 W. R. Grace & Co., a Connecticut corporation doing business 
in the commonwealth, sold its 52 percent stock interest in the Miller 
Brewing Company, a corporation having no base of operations in Massa-
41 rd. at 1503, 391 N.E.2d at 264. 
42 rd. at 1504, 391 N.E.2d at 265. 
43 rd. at 1504-05, 391 N.E.2d at 265. See also F.W. Woolworth v. Commissioner 
of Taxes, 130 Vt. 544, 298 A.2d 839 (1972) (cited by the Dow Court as authority 
for the proposition that inclusion of the foreign gross-up in income without some 
offset might well require a special alteration of the apportionment fonnula). 
44 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1505, 391 N.E.2d at 265. 
411 rd. 
46 rd. 
47 Ct. C.L. c. 62, § 1(e) (definition of dividend for individual income tax). 
48 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1927, 393 N.E.2d 330 (1979). 
49 rd. at 1927-28, 393 N.E.2d at 331. 
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chusetts.5o Grace, a company with multi-state and multi-national opera-
tions, had significant business operations in Massachusetts,51 The cor-
porate excise statute taxes foreign corporations doing business in the 
commonwealth only on their income "derived from business carried on 
within the commonwealth." 52 On this basis, Grace concluded that the 
income from the sale of an investment in Miller stock was wholly un-
related to its Massachusetts operations and hence exempt from the 
Massachusetts corporate excise tax. 53 The Commissioner disagreed and 
litigation ensued. The Appellate Tax Board ruled in the Commissioner's 
favor. 54 On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the decision 
of the Appellate Tax Board.55 
In reaching its decision, the Court first considered Grace's contention 
that the sale of its 52 percent stock interest in Miller was not "business 
income" within the meaning of chapter 63, section 38.56 Grace argued 
that its Miller holdings were a passive investment giving rise to non-
business income not subject to the income apportionment formula of 
the corporate excise tax. 57 Grace stated that it was not in the business 
of buying and selling corporate securities and that its relationship with 
Miller remained "arm's length." 58 The Court, however, accepted the 
Appellate Tax Board's finding that part of Grace's "business included 
the purchase and sale of operating subsidiaries." 59 Noting that Grace 
had initially sought to control Miller,60 the Court ruled that the Miller 
majority stock acquisition was the equivalent of a purchase of an operat-
ing subsidiary.s1 The Court concluded that since Grace had acquired 
Miller as an operating asset, the gain resulting from the sale of the 
Miller interest was "derived from business" within the meaning of the 
income apportionment statute.62 
The Court also rejected Grace's alternative contention that the income 
realized on the sale of the Miller stock was not income derived from 
150 ld. at 1929, 1935, 393 N.E.2d 332, 334. 
51 ld. at 1929, 393 N.E.2d at 332. 
52 C.L. c. 63, § 38. 
1i3 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1931-32, 393 N.E.2d at 333. 
54 ld. at 1931, 393 N.E.2d at 332. 
551d. 
1i6 ld. at 1931-32, 393 N.E.2d at 333. See C.L. c. 63, § 38. 
1i7 ld. at 1932, 393 N.E.2d at 333. 
liS ld. at 1932-33, 393 N.E.2d at 333. The purpose of its acquisition and actual 
use of the stock provides the proper standard to determine whether its sale produces 
''business'' as opposed to "investment" income. ld. at 1934, 393 N.E.2d 334. 
59 ld. at 1933, 393 N.E.2d at 333. 
60 ld. at 1934, 393 N.E.2d at 334. Crace's goal of complete ownership was 
thwarted by a minority shareholder's disinclination to sell. ld. 
611d. 
62 ld. at 1935, 393 N.E.2d at 333. 
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business carried on in the commonwealth.68 The Court explained that 
in order for business income to be subject to section 38 apportionment, 
an actual physical situs of the business in the state is not required. 64 
The Court recognized, however, that there must be some "minimal con~ 
nection" between Massachusetts and the income producing transaction.61S 
The Court noted that this connection has "been found when the activity 
sought to be taxed is a component of an enterprise which is deemed 
'unitary' with the business carried on in the taxing State." 66 It stated 
that affiliated corporations would be considered component members 
of a "unitary" business when "they are of mutual benefit to one another" 
and when "each operation is dependent on or contributory to others." 67 
The Court accepted the board's findings that Grace had acquired its 
Miller holdings to bolster its consumer products division.6s On this 
basis the Court reasoned that the Miller holding was a part of Grace's 
unitary operations.69 Applying this analysis, the Court concluded that 
the gain realized from the sale of the Miller holding was derived from 
business carried on within the commonwealth.70 
In distinguishing between business income and investment income, 
the Grace Court interpreted the term "business" broadly. It rejected 
Grace's contention that gain from a sale of stock could not be business 
income unless the corporation was in the business of buying and selling 
securities.71 Instead, it emphasized that the purchase and subsequent 
sale of stock in an operating company could give rise to business income 
within the meaning of chapter 63, section 38, if one aspect of the tax~ 
payer's business was the acquisition and sale of operating subsidiaries.72 
The taxpayels failure to take an active role in the management of the 
company when it possessed sufficient control to do so will not change 
the business character of the purchase.73 The Court stated that the 
purpose underlying the acquisition of the stock and the overall use of 
the stock during the taxpayer's holding period should be the focus of 
tlie inquiry.74 Because of the Court's emphasis upon intent, one may 
68 Id. at 1940, 393 N.E.2d at 336. 
04 Id. at 1937, 393 N.E.2d at 335. 
MId. 
68 Id. 
67 Id. at 1938, 393 N.E.2d at 335. 
68 Id. at 1939, 393 N.E.2d at 335. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. The Court also quickly disposed of Grace's contentions that the applica~ 
tion of the apportionment statute to this gain violated the due process and com~ 
merce clauses of the federal constitution and art. X (representative taxation} of 
the state constitution. Id. at 194046, 393 N.E.2d at ~38. 
71 Id. at 1933, 393 N.E.2d at 333. 
72 Id. at 1933.34, 393 N.E.2d at 333-34. 
78 Id. at 1934, 393 N.E.2d at 334. 
74Id. 
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well find the Commissioner arguing in future cases that even the sale 
of a minority stock interest should give rise to ''business'' as opposed to 
"investment" income of the original purchase fit within the corporation's 
unitary operations.75 
§16.4. Corporate Excise Tax-Legislation. The Massachusetts net 
income of corporations having multi-state operations is assessed by 
means of the apportionment formula contained in section 38 of chapter 
63.1 One of the factors in this formula is sales made within the com-
monwealth.2 
Chapter 530 of the Acts of 1978 modified the statutory definition and 
construction of the sales factors of the apportionment formula to change 
the tax treatment of sales to the federal government and sales to foreign 
purchasers.s Previously, if goods were delivered or shipped to the fed-
eral government in Massachusetts, they were deemed to have been sold 
in Massachusetts regardless of whether the goods were to be resold.4 
As amended, the statute now excludes from sales made within the com-
monwealth "sales of tangible personal property to the United States 
Government . . . for purposes of resale to a foreign government . . . ." 5 
Section 38 also provides that sales by a corporation of tangible personal 
property are made within the commonwealth if the corporation is not 
taxable in the state of the purchaser.6 Chapter 530 modifies this rule 
by providing that "the corporation will be deemed to be taxable in the 
state of the purchaser if the tangible personal property is delivered or 
shipped to a purchaser in a foreign country . . . ." 7 Thus, if a corpora-
tion can demonstrate that sales are made within the commonwealth 
only for delivery to a purchaser in a foreign country, those sales should 
not be considered part of the corporation's net income subject to taxa-
tion by the commonwealth. 
Chapter 796 of the Acts of 1979 amended the definition of corporate 
gross income by inserting a deduction from gross income for qualified 
"income received from the sale, lease or other transfer of tangible, in-
tangible, personal or real property or materials manufactured in the 
711 See Ul. at 1939, 393 N.E.2d at 335. 
§16.4. 1 G.L. c. 63, § 38. 
2 Id. Subsection (f) states that "[t]he sales factor is a fraction the numerator 
of which is the total sales of the corporation in this commonwealth during the 
taxable year, and the denominator of which is the total sales of the corporation 
everywhere during the taxable year." Id. 
a Acts of 1978, c. 530, § 1. This stature is effective for taxable years ending 
on or after December 31, 1978. 
4 G.L. c. 63, § 38(f) (for years ending on or before December 30, 1978). 
II G.L. c. 63, 38(£), as amended by Acts of 1978, c. 530, § 1. 
6 G.L. c. 63, § 38(f)(2). 
7 Acts of 1978, c. 530, § 1. 
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commonwealth subject to" certain energy-related patents.8 This deduc-
tion applies to patents approved by the Secretary of Energy Resources 
as useful for energy conservation or alternative energy development.9 
Chapter 796 provides that the deduction shall extend for a maximum of 
five years from the date of issuance of the patent or the date of approval 
by the secretary.10 
Chapter 796 also inserted into the personal income tax statute a similar 
but not identical exclusion for individual taxpayers.ll The textual and 
conceptual differences between the personal deduction and the corpo-
rate deduction, however, will cause interpretive difficulties. The per-
sonal deduction specifies that the inventor or the holder of the qualified 
and certified patent could exclude any income "including royalty in-
come" received "from the sale, lease or other transfer . . ." of such a 
patent.12 The language including "royalty income" within the meaning 
of "any income" is not present in the corporate exclusion.1s This omis-
sion would seem to indicate that royalty income from the complete 
transfer of the patent was not intended by the legislature to qualify 
for the corporation exclusion. The interpretive question presented, as in 
the case of the individual deduction,14 is whether the phrase "in the 
Commonwealth" modifies the words "sale, lease or other transfer" as 
well as the words "materials manufactured." In any event, income re-
ceived by a certified Massachusetts corporation from the sale, lease, or 
transfer in the commonwealth of intangible property subject to such 
patent is to be deducted from gross income. lIS 
§16.5. Sales and Use Taxation. In Lowell Gas Company v. Commis-
sioner of Corporations and Taxation 1 the Supreme Judicial Court con-
sidered whether gas mains, gas services, gas meters, and meter installa-
tions are exempted from sales tax.2 Chapter 64H, section 6( s), exempts 
from sales and use taxation "sales of machinery or replacement parts 
thereof used directly and exclusively . . . in the furnishing of gas, water, 
steam or electricity when delivered to consumers through mains, lines 
or pipes . . . ." 3 The Court held that the disputed items are such 
8 C.L. c. 63, § 30, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 10 (effective Janu-
ary 1, 1980). 
9 Id. 
10 Id. 
11 C.L. c. 62, § (2)(a)(2)(C). See § 2 supra text at notes 42-46. 
12 C.L. c. 62, § (2) (a) (2)( C), added by, Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 8 (emphasis 
added). 
13 C.L. c. 63, § 30, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 10. 
14 See § 16.2 text at notes 42-46 supra. 
lIS C.L. c. 63, § 30, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 10. 
§16.5. 1 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 323, 385 N.E.2d 991. 
2 Id. at 323-24, 385 N.E.2d at 991-92. 
3 C.L. c. 64H. § 6(8). 
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machinery within the meaning of the statute.4 Thus, the Court ruled 
that they are exempt from sales and use tax.1i 
Beyond the substantive issue involved, the procedural posture of 
Lowell Gas is of interest to taxpayers generally. Although Massachu-
setts law then and now provides that the abatement procedure is the 
exclusive remedy to contest most Massachusetts taxes,6 the taxpayer in 
Lowell Gas did not bring this exemption issue before the Supreme Judi-
cial Court by means of an abatement proceeding. Instead, it com-
menced a suit in equity in the county court seeking declaratory and 
injunctive relief.7 Consequently, it appears that if a taxpayer can 
demonstrate an otherwise justiciable controversy, the "exclusive remedy" 
provision of chapter 62C, section 41, will not bar the superior court 8 
from entertaining an action for declaratory relief pursuant to chapter 
231A.9 
In Northgate Construction Co., Inc. v. State Tax Commission,10 the 
Supreme Judicial Court construed a second exemption from sales and 
use taxes. This exemption is applicable to sales of "building materials 
and supplies to be used in the construction . . . of any building . . . 
owned by or held in trust for the benefit of . . . " certain governmental 
bodies and agencies. ll The taxpayer, a general contractor, participated 
in the construction of two low income housing projects for the elderly.12 
These projects were built under a plan of development known as "turn-
key construction." 13 These projects are arranged so that by contract of 
sale the developer retains title to the land and buildings until the project 
is completed and approved.14 Only upon approval is title transferred 
to the local housing authority.15 The Court found that since the con-
tractor had title to the property when he purchased the materials, the 
4 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 325, 385 N.E.2d at 992. 
5 Id. 
6 "The remedies prOVided by section thirty-seven to forty, inclusive, shall be 
exclusive whether or not the tax is wholly illegal. But the word 'exclusive' in this 
section shall not be construed to deprive any person of a right of action at law in 
any federal court." C.L. c. 62G, § 41. 
7 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 323, 385 N.E.2d at 991. See C.L. c. 231A, § 1. 
8 A suit seeking declaratory relief can be commenced in the Supreme Judicial 
Court, the superior court, the land court and the probate courts, assuming of course 
the justiciable controve.rsy is otherwise within their respective jurisdictions. C.L. c. 
231A, § 1. ' 
9 See, e.g., Creen v. Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 364 Mass. 389, 305 N.E.2d 
92 (1973). 
10 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 385 N.E.2d 967. 
11 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(f). 
12 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 257, 385 N.E.2d 968. 
13 Id. at 258, 385 N.E.2d at 968. 
14 Id. 
15 Id. 
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prospective purchaser, in this case the housing authority, could not be 
the "owner" of the project during its construction.16 It also determined 
that the developer's contractual obligation to build and convey the 
property did not render him a trustee of the property for the benefit of 
the prospective owner.17 Given the specific language of the statutory 
exemption, the Court concluded that an expansive reading of the word 
"owner" was inappropriate. 18 Reasoning that sales tax liability is 
determined at the point of sale and not at some future date, the Court 
upheld the imposition of the sales tax on the materials used in a turn-
key housing project.19 Turnkey developers should take note and include 
a sales tax component in future development proposals. 
During the Survey year, the Department of Revenue issued new in-
terpretive regulations under the sales and use tax statutes. Several 
focused on the application of the sales and use tax to various motor 
vehicle transactions.20 Others dealt with exempt intrafamily sales,21 
sales taxed in other jurisdictions,22 and service businesses.23 
Since a true gift involves no sale element, no sales tax can be appli-
cable. In August 1979, the Commissioner issued regulations spelling out 
the exemption requirements for certain motor vehicle transfers untaxed 
due to a deemed lack of consideration.24 The regulations provide that 
outright gifts to the extent substantiated by the donor's affidavit, trans-
fers by inheritance or will, repossessions, and transfers to rafHe winners 
are exempted from the tax.25 This regulation also provides, however, 
that the automobile dealer who donates a car to a rafHe is deemed "to 
have used it for its own purposes," thereby rendering the dealer liable 
for the use tax based upon the cost to the dealer.26 
This regulation also addresses the application of the sales and use tax 
to the leasing or rental of motor vehicles. The general rule is that the 
total charge for the rental period is subject to the five percent tax.27 
If, however, any motor vehicle is leased for a year or more, additional 
or incidental charges, whether for insurance, excises, or registration fees, 
will not be taxed if such charges are separately stated.28 In lieu of 
16 ld. at 261, 385 N.E.2d at 969. 
17 ld. at 262, 385 N.E.2d at 970. 
18 ld. at 261, 385 N.E.2d at 969. 
19 ld. at 260, 385 N.E.2d at 969. 
20 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6). 
21 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(5). 
221d. 
23 830 C.M.R. 64H.03. 
24 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6). 
25 ld. 
26 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6)(a) (4). 
27 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6)(b). 
28 830 C.M.R. 64H.02( 6) (b)( 3). 
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separately stated charges, if a "passenger automobile" is leased for a 
year or more, and the insurance, excises, and fees are paid by the lessor, 
the total rental charge may be reduced by twenty percent before apply-
ing the tax.29 If a truck is leased for a year or more in the same cir-
cumstances, the total charges may be reduced by thirty percent.80 
Finally, this regulation deals with the application of the use tax to 
a dealer who allows vehicles held for sale to be used by his salesmen, 
family, or any other person for non-business purposes.31 If, for instance, 
a dealer brings home a car out of inventory for his spouse, a use tax 
based on acquisition cost is then due.32 If this car is returned to in-
ventory and another taken, the latter will be subject to tax without 
allowance for the returned vehicle.33 If vehicles so used bear dealer 
plates, the dealer may either pay the full tax at the commencement of 
such use of each vehicle or pay a monthly tax on all vehicles so used 
based on a percentage, initially set at three percent, of his cost of those 
vehicles.34 
In 1979, the Commissioner promulgated a regulation dealing with 
exempt intra-family sales.311 Chapter 64H, section 6( c), exempts from 
the sales tax "casual and isolated sales by a vendor who is not regularly 
engaged in the business of making sales at retail . . .. " 36 Sales exempt 
from sales tax are also exempt from the use tax, except that the pur-
chaser of a motor vehicle in a "casual sale" must pay the use tax 3'1 
unless "said purchaser is the spouse, mother, father, brother, sister or 
child of the seller." 88 The newly issued regulation tracks the statute in 
part and prOvides that buyers of motor vehicles "shall be exempt from 
tax if . . . the purchaser is the parent, spouse, child, brother or sister of 
the seller . . . ." 39 The regulation, however, limits the exemption to 
those instances where "[the sales/use] tax was previously paid." 40 This 
latter requirement is questionable, because the statute simply exempts 
intra-family casual sales without requiring the prior payment of the 
sales/use tax.41 
29 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6)(b)(1). Note that the transaction must be a true 
rental as opposed to a "finance leasing" arrangement. Id. 
80 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6)(b)(3). 
31 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(6)(c). 
82Id. 
33 Id. 
a. Id. 
311 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(5)(c). 
36 G.L. c. 64H, § 6(c). 
37 Id., § 6(b). 
38 G.L. c. 641, § 7(b). 
39 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(5)(c). 
40 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(5)(c)(2). 
41 Many situations can be envisioned where the selling family member or even 
prior owners properly did not pay the sales/use tax. For example, assume that 
26
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1979 [1979], Art. 19
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1979/iss1/19
464 1979 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §16.5 
Another questionable regulation issued in the Survey year deals with 
the use tax exemption that applies when a buyer has duly paid a validly 
assessed sales tax to another state.42 The exemption, which resembles 
a credit conceptually, does not apply, however, to the extent the Massa-
chusetts rate of tax, currently five percent, exceeds the rate of the other 
jurisdiction.43 Thus, the buyer would be required to pay a Massachu-
setts use tax amounting to the difference between the two rates. The 
regulation provides that the exemption or credit will be available only 
if all the following four requirements are met: 
1. The tax paid in the other state was legally due that state. 
2. The purchaser has no right to a refund or credit from that other 
state either at the time of application for a Massachusetts out-of-
state purchase exemption or, in the event that exemption is granted, 
following its allowance. 
3. Such motor vehicle at the time it was purchased was not intended 
for use in Massachusetts. A motor vehicle will be presumed to have 
been bought for use in the commonwealth if it was not used for a 
six month period outside of Massachusetts. This period will be 
measured from the day the out-of-state purchase is completed to 
the day the motor vehicle is delivered to a shipping agent, placed 
in storage for shipment to the commonwealth, or is brought into 
Massachusetts for use here. Conversely, if it is shown that motor 
vehicle was used for the requisite six months outside of Massachu-
setts, it will be presumed that the purchase was made for out-of-
state use. Either presumption may be overcome by evidence to the 
contrary. 
4. The state or jurisdiction to which a sales or use tax was paid 
allows a corresponding exemption for a sales or use tax paid to this 
state. 44 
a father, while living and working in New Hampshire, purchases a new car. Two 
years later, the father is transferred by his employer to Massachusetts, where the 
family takes up residence. No sales/use tax is then due when the father registers 
the automobile in Massachusetts. The sales tax cannot apply to a sale outside the 
commonwealth. C.L. c. 64H, § 6(a). The use tax does not apply, because the 
ear, although used in the commonwealth, was not purchased with the intention of 
using it in Massachusetts. C.L. c. 641, § 2. If, however, the father retires and 
sells the car to his son, the new regulation would deny the son the intra-family 
casual sale exemption because "no tax was previously paid." To the extent the 
regulation would deny the exemption for such lack of payment, the regulation 
appears to be invalid. 
42 C.L. c. 641, § 7(0). 
43Id. 
44 830 C.M.R. 64H.02(5)(f). 
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The six month out-of-state use requirement of the regulation is prob-
lematic. The Massachusetts sales/use tax simply does not reach an 
out-of-state automobile purchase unless the car was purchased "from 
any vendor for storage, use or consumption within the Commonwealth." 415 
Although no exemption or credit is needed unless the transaction is in 
the first instance subject to the tax, the Regulation would give the 
credit or exemption to a buyer not subject to the tax, and on the other 
hand deny the exemption to the buyer who is subject to the tax.46 To 
the extent of such denial, this regulation seems improper. 
The Commissioner also issued a well-reasoned regulation spelling out 
the application of the sales tax to service businessY The regulation 
prOVides that if the personal property segment of a total service trans-
action is "inconsequential" and the service provider does not separately 
state a charge for the "inconsequential personal property," the entire 
transaction is exempt from sales tax. 48 Although the regulation does 
not define "inconsequential," it suggests as a guideline that a value of 
ten percent or less of the total charge may be considered "inconsequen-
tial." 49 If a service provider does separately state a charge for the 
property, a tax is to be collected from the customer, regardless of 
whether or not the property for which the separate charge was made 
was inconsequential. 50 If the property is not inconsequential, the serv-
ice provider would be well-advised to state separately a charge for such 
property, since the transaction will be subject to sales tax in either case.l;t 
In fact, if a repairman's records (and presumably those of other service 
providers) do not adequately separate the "fair retail selling price" of 
the property from the service charges, the Commissioner will simply 
presume the entire aggregate charge to be subject to tax. 52 Since the 
regulation does not indicate whether wholesale or retail value should 
be used to determine whether property is "inconsequential," it will have 
the effect of encouraging a separately stated charge for all but the most 
45 C.L. c. 641, § 2. 
46 For example, a life-long Massachusetts resident travels to California where he 
purchases a car and pays a four and three fourths percent state sales tax. He 
intends to drive around the country and then return to Massachusetts. Since he 
purchased the car in California intending to use it in Massachusetts, he seems liable 
for the use tax when he registers the automobile in Massachusetts. This regulation, 
however, would deny him a credit for the tax paid to California because the car 
was purchased with the intention of using it in Massachusetts. 
47 830 C.M.R. 64H.03. 
48 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(2)(a). 
49 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(l). Of course, in this instance, the service enterprise is 
itself a consumer of personal property and should pay sales tax when it purchases 
the property. 
50 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(2)(b)(1). 
51 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(2)(b) (2). 
52 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(5)(a). 
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obviously inconsequential property. The regulation also states that a 
service enterprise selling personal property outside the service trans-
action itself will be regarded as a retailer with respect to such goods.53 
In such instances, the service enterprise must collect from the customer 
the sales tax based on the retail price of the goods. 54 
This regulation also provides that the sales tax is to be assessed on 
any "fabrication." 55 A "fabrication" is defined as "[a]ny change in the 
form or substance of tangible personal property, or any substantial al-
teration in the form or shape of an existing article of tangible personal 
property where either party to the transaction furnishes the mate-
rial .... " 56 Thus, under the regulation, a reupholsterer or maker of 
custom curtains must collect a sales tax from his customers on the entire 
charge regardless of whether the material and labor charges are sepa-
rately stated. 57 Conceptually, the unstated logic is that a "fabricator" 
makes and sells a new product. Like any manufacturer who sells to 
the public, it must collect a tax on the aggregate sales price to its cus-
tomer. 
Finally, this regulation dealing with service enterprises speaks to 
service contract situations. It states that when a service provider in 
a service contract covering a specified period of time promises to supply 
necessary parts and supplies, as well as labor, for "a specified contract 
price:' a sales tax is due from the provider on his acquisition cost of 
the materials and parts. 58 If a particular part is not covered by the 
contract, imposition of the sales tax on the customer will turn on whether 
there is a separately stated charge for that item. 51) This type of service 
enterprise will frequently perform two roles. Identical materials may 
be held as inventory for sale to customers or may be held for consump-
tion by the service prOVider pursuant to his various contracts. Since 
the total sales tax due with respect to all materials will vary according 
to the portion assessed either to the provider at cost or to the customer 
at retail, accurate record keeping for these businesses will be essential. 
In addition to regulatory developments in the sales tax area, there 
were legislative ones as well. In its 1979 session, the legislature added 
five additional exemptions to the sales tax statutory scheme. The legis-
lature enacted a speCific exemption for prescribed insulin needles and 
58 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(5)(b). 
54 Id. 
55 830 C.M.R. 64H.03( 3). 
~ Id. 
57 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(5)(e),(f). 
58 830 C.M.R. 64H.03(5)(g). The promisee under the service contract in such 
case pays no tax. Id. 
GIl Id. 
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syringes as well as for sales of the insulin itself.60 It also provided an 
exemption for "[s]ales of patterns, molds, dies, tools, sand-handling 
equipment and machinery, and replacement parts thereof" provided that 
such property is "used exclusively in the manufacture of cast metal 
products to be sold in the regular course of business." 61 Qualification 
for this exemption is not determined until after the sale and then ac-
cording to the use to which the property is put.62 Since vendors may 
be held personally liable for the tax which is required to be collected 
from purchasers,63 a prudent seller of such property should require from 
his buyer an exempt use certificate in order to avoid the seller's potential 
tax liability to the commonwealth.64 
Two bills passed during the 1979 legislative session created specific 
sales tax exemptions of benefit to the printing industry. The first enact-
ment created exemptions for composed type, film positives, and film 
negatives purchased by a printer or publisher of certain materials from 
a "typographer, compositor or color separator." 65 One exemption is 
conditioned upon use of any of the materials by the printer or publisher 
in "the preparation of printed matter to be sold." 66 The second exemp-
tion is available with respect to "the fabrication or transfer of such film 
positives, film negatives, reproduction proofs or impressed matter" for 
use in printing. 67 The second bill inserted in the sales tax statute an 
exemption for the sale of printed material, manufactured in the com-
monwealth to the special order of a purchaser, for delivery to a pur-
chaser or his designee located outside the commonwealth.68 The statute 
already exempted sales where the seller is obligated to deliver the goods 
to an interstate carrier for delivery to an out-of-state purchaser.69 This 
new exemption was undoubtedly sought by the printing industry to 
overcome the decision in George S. Carrington v. State Tax Commis-
sion,7° where the Supreme Judicial Court had denied a sales tax exemp-
tion to a printer who had manufactured certain religious materials to 
the specifications of its out-of-state charitable customers, because the 
items were delivered by an interstate carrier to an out-of-state designee 
60 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(1), added by Acts of 1979, c. 700. 
61 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(ee), added by Acts of 1979, c. 555. 
62 ld. 
63 See C.L. c. 64H, § 3. 
64 See C.L. c. 64H, § 8(f),(g). 
65 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(gg), added by Acts of 1979, c. 757. 
66 ld. 
67 ld. 
68 C.L. c. 64H, § 6( £f), added by Acts of 1979, c. 590, § 1. This exemption 
was made retroactively applicable to covered transactions occurring on or after 
January 1, 1976. Acts of 1979, c. 590, § 2. 
69 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(b). 
70 375 Mass. 549, 377 N.E.2d 950 (1978). 
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of the buyer and not to a purchaser outside the commonwealth.71 The 
new statute does not explain what constitutes material manufactured to 
the special order of a purchaser. It is unclear, for instance, whether 
matter printed from standard photographic plates but, specially selected 
and assembled to a customer's order would qualify. Interpretive regula-
tions on this point would be useful. 
Chapter 796 of the Acts of 1979, a statute addressing the energy needs 
of the commonwealth generally, has created for a limited time an ex-
emption from sales taxes for certain sales of "equipment directly relating 
to any wood-fueled heating system." 72 Only equipment approved by 
either the state fire marshal or the state building commission will qual-
ify.7s In addition, the equipment must cost more than nine hundred 
dollars and be used by the consumer "as a primary heating system for 
... a person's principal residence in the commonwealth." 74 Cautious 
sellers of such equipment wary of their potential tax liability should 
require from their buyers an exempt use certificate.711 
§16.6. Personal Property Taxation. There were relatively few devel-
opments in the area of personal property taxation during the Survey 
year. The Appellate Tax Board decided one case 1 dealing with the 
domestic manufacturing corporation classification.2 Under section 5 of 
chapter 59 of the General Laws, the machinery and equipment of a 
domestic manufacturing corporation are exempt from local property 
taxes.s In lieu of the local taxes, the manufacturing corporation pays 
a tax of two dollars and sixty cents per thousand dollars of book value 
of such property.4 Prior cases had established that corporations need 
not conduct an entire unitary manufacturing process to be entitled to 
the classification. IS To qualify it is sufficient that the operatiqns in ques-
71 rd. at 550, 377 N.E.2d at 951. 
72 C.L. c. 64H, § 6(hh), added by Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 11. This exempnon 
will be available for qualifying sales made between January 1, 1979, and December 
31, 1983. Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 35. 
78 Acts of 1979, c. 796, § 11. 
74 rd. 
711 C.L. c. 64H, § 8(f),(g). 
§16.6. 1 Cowles Technology Labs, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n (1979) STATE TAX 
RPrR. (MASS.) (CCH) 11" 200-537. 
2 C.L. c. 63, § 38C; c. 59, § 5, cl sixteenth. 
8 C.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. sixteenth. 
4 C.L. c. 63, § 32 ( 1)( a). Most manufacturing corporations, both domestic and 
foreign, would probably be classified as "tangible property corporations," C.L. c. 
63, § 30 (10), whose excise taxes due the commonwealth will be computed in 
~rt on the book value of their machinery and equipment. See C.L. c. 63, § 32 
(domestic corporations), C.L. c. 63, § 39 (foreign corporations). 
II See, e.g., Joseph T. Rossi, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 369 Mass. 178, 181, 338 
N.E.2d 557, 559 (1975). 
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tion, while not producing a finished product ready for the ultimate con-
sumer, form "an essential and integral part of a total manufacturing 
process." 6 The Appellate Tax Board's decision in Cowles Technology 
Labs Inc. v. State Tax Commission 7 reaffirmed this proposition of tax 
law. 
The taxpayer in Cowles was a producer of crushed powders under an 
arrangement whereby its customers would send the taxpayer certain raw 
materials to be processed according to precise specifications furnished 
by the customer.S Once processing was complete, the taxpayer sent 
the powders to its customers who utilized them in producing a wide 
range of commodities.o The State Tax Commission determined that such 
activity did not qualify the taxpayer for qualification as a manufacturing 
corporation.10 
On appeal, the Appellate Tax Board reversed the Tax Commission's 
decision. The Board noted that the applicable statute lacked a defini-
tion of manufacturing.ll It therefore applied the Supreme Judicial 
Court definition of manufacturing as involving "change wrought through 
the application of forces directed by the human mind, which results in 
the transformation of some preexisting substance ... into something 
different with a new name, nature or use." 12 The Board determined 
that the processes employed by the taxpayer fell within this definition.1s 
Based on this finding, the Board held that, although the taxpayer did 
not produce a finished product, it was nevertheless entitled to classifica-
tion as a manufacturing corporation, because its operations constituted 
an integral step in the manufacturing activities of its customer.14 
Two statutes in the area of personal property taxation which became 
effective during the Survey year are of interest. Chapter 777 of the Acts 
of 1979 exempts from local taxation the machinery and other personal 
property owned by either domestic business corporations or foreign 
corporations to the extent that it is directly used in drycleaning or 
laundering processes.15 Chapter 581 of the Acts of 1978 increased the 
6 Id. In Rossi, the operation of a sawmill which converted standing timber into 
cut lumber of different sizes was held to constitute manufacturing activities entitling 
the taxpayer to the manufacturing classification. Id. But see Charles River Breed-
ing Labs, Inc. v. State Tax Comm'n, 374 Mass. 333, 373 N .E.2d 768 (1978) (ani-
mal breeding not within the common understanding of manufacturing.) 
7 (1979), STATE TAX RPTR. (MASS.) (CCH) 1f 200-537. 
8 Id. at 10,586. 
9 Id. 
10 Id. at 10,585. 
11 Id. See G.L. c. 63, § 38C. 
12 369 Mass. at 180, 338 N.E.2d at 558. 
13 (1979) STATE TAX RPTR. (MASS.) (CCH) 11" 200-537 at 10,587. 
14 Id. at 10,588. 
15 G.L. c. 59, § 4, cl. sixteenth, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 777. 
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personal property exemption of commercial fishermen from five thou-
sand to ten thousand dollars.16 While chapter 777 merely created a 
new exemption, chapter 581 also created a new excise tax on boats, 
ships, and vessels in lieu of the local personal property tax.17 This stat-
ute, adding chapter 60B of the General Laws, requires owners of vessels 
to report annually to the municipality in which the owner has his usual 
mooring or docking space certain information, including a description 
of his vessel and his estimate of the fair cash value of the vessel.18 The 
excise tax, paid to the mooring municipality, is set at the rate of ten 
dollars per thousand dollars of fair cash value as determined by the 
municipality's assessors.19 The maximum excise on any vessel regardless 
of size is set at five hundred dollars.20 This tax is unquestionably a 
boon to boat owners, because payment of the new excise exempts the 
owner from the local property tax that would otherwise be payable.21 
Since the local property tax rate is customarily much higher than the 
excise and is assessable on full cash value subject to no maximum, an 
owner of a substantial pleasure boat is advised to pay the new excise 
tax.22 
§16.7. Real Estate Taxation-Decisional Law. The Survey year wit-
nessed substantial judicial activity in the area of real estate taxation. 
In the first of several decisions, the Supreme Judicial Court in Pequot 
Associates v. Board of Assessors of Salem,l focused its attention on the 
urban redevelopment excise tax.2 The excise statute as then in! effect 
exempted qualified low and moderate income housing project~ro:m 
property taxes for forty years.3 In return for the exemption, the om-
monwealth imposes an excise tax at the rate of five percent of the gro . 
income of the project plus one percent of the fair cash value of the 
16 C.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. nineteenth, as amended by Acts of 1978, c. 581, § 2. 
This exemption, as before, applies "in respect to boats, fishing gear and nets owned 
and actually used by him in the prosecution of his business if engaged exclusively 
in commercial fishing .... " ld. This increased exemption became effective July 
1, 1979. Acts of 1978, c. 581, § 8. 
17 C.L. c. BOB, as enacted by Acts of 1978, c. 581, § 5. The new excise tax 
became effective July 1, 1979. Acts of 1978, c. 581, § 8. 
18 C.L. c. 60B, § 2. 
19 ld. 
20ld. 
21 C.L. c. 6OB, § 2( d). See C.L. c. 59, § 4. 
22 For those limited exemptions from the new excise, see C.L. c. 6OB, § 3. 
§16.7. 1 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2411, 380 N.E.2d 648. 
2 C.L. c. 121A, § 10. 
3 C.L. c. 121A, § 10, as amended by Acts of 1969, c. 540, § 1. The current 
scheme provides an initial period of exemption of fifteen years subject to extension 
of up to an additional twenty-five years. C.L. c. 121A, § 10, as amended by Acts 
of 1975, c. 827, § 7 [hereinafter cited as C.L. c. 121A, § 10]. 
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project for the benefit of the situs municipality.4 This statutory scheme 
requires the local assessors to determine this cash value each January 
1st. The value so determined is utilized in computing the excise due 
for the prior calendar year. 5 According to the statute, the value will not 
be redetermined if an original maximum fair cash valuation was made 
at the request of the Department of Community Affairs (DCA).6 In 
addition to providing an exemption from property taxes, the urban re-
development statute also permits the developer to escape local special 
assessments and betterments by means of an optional agreement with 
the municipality.7 
Pequot, a limited partnership acting as an urban development corpo-
ration under chapter 121A of the General Laws, had constructed in 
Salem a low and moderate income housing project. 8 Pursuant to a DCA 
request for valuation, the "maximum value" was established at $300,000 
for the land and $3,470,000 for the building on completion, for a total 
of $3,770,000.9 In addition, Pequot made an optional agreement with 
the municipality to make annual payments geared to fair cash value.10 
Despite the DCA maximum valuation, the local assessors redetermined 
the fair cash value as of January 1, 1975, to be $5,770,000, claiming that 
Pequot had breached the optional agreement and that the breach viti-
ated compliance with the "maximum" valuation.11 In addition to their 
disagreement over the applicable valuation, the developer and the as-
sessors also disagreed about the completion date of the project.12 This 
date determined whether the property was taxed in 1974 at $300,000, 
the value of the land alone, or $3,770,000, the value of the property with 
the completed building. The Appellate Tax Board summarily disposed 
of the assessor's valuation argument and ruled that, even if proven, a 
breach of the optional agreement would furnish no justification for 
exceeding the maximum valuation preliminarily established at DCA's re-
quest.13 In addition, the Board, finding that the project had been 
completed in 1974, held that the $3,770,000 valuation applied for that 
year and thereafter, both for the purpose of the excise tax liability and 
for the contractual liability respecting the special assessments and better-
ments.14 
4 C.L. c. 121A, § 10. 
r; Id. 
6Id. 
7 Id., §§ 6A, 10. 
8 1978 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2412, 380 N.E.2d at 649. 
9 Id. at 2413, 380 N.E.2d at 649. 
10 Id. 
11 Id. at 2415, 380 N.E.2d at 650. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 2414, 380 N.E.2d at 650. 
14 Id. at 2414-15, 380 N.E.2<l at 650. 
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The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the Board's determination that 
the project was complete in 1974 for excise tax purposes.15 The Court 
accepted the Board's findings that the project was completed when the 
city of Salem had approved the project for occupancy in 1974 and that 
the taxpayer developer had reported gross income from the project for 
the year.16 It rejected the taxpayer's argument that completion did not 
occur until the lender, the Massachusetts Housing Finance Authority, 
issued a certificate of acceptance in February 1974.17 The Court noted 
that the lender's purposes for determining completion of the project 
related only to its interest in ensuring the financial stability of the proj-
ect. The Court therefore found no necessary connection between the 
date the certificate issued and the date the project starts generating 
income subject to the urban redevelopment excise tax. IS Thus, the 
Court concluded that for purposes of determining the completion date 
of property subject to the urban redevelopment excise tax, the assessors 
should look to the actual date of completion of construction rather than 
the date of the issuance of the lender's certificate of acceptance.19 
In another Survey year case, Henry Perkins Co. v. Board of Assessors 
of Bridgewater,20 the Supreme Judicial Court construed the state statute 
establishing a real estate tax exemption for buildings constructed to 
eliminate industrial waste.21 In 1972, the Henry Perkins Company, a 
manufacturer of metal castings, was ordered by the commonwealth to 
institute measures to comply with air pollution regulations. 22 The com-
pany thereupon built a new facility for melting scrap. The facility 
contained a furnace designed to eliminate the offending pollution.23 
The taxpayer sought to use the real estate tax exemption available under 
clause 44 for a "building . . . which is constructed, installed or placed 
in operation, in whole or in part, for the purpose of eliminating indus-
trial waste . . . ." 24 The Appellate Tax Board interpreted the statute 
as requiring that the dominant purpose of a building be to eliminate 
15 ld. at 2420, 380 N.E.2d at 650. The Court, partially reversing the Board, 
also held that the developer was not liable in 1974 under the special assessments 
agreement with the city. ld. 
16 ld. at 2418, 380 N.E.2d at 650. 
17 ld. at 2416, 380 N.E.2d at 650. 
IS ld. The Court also summarily dismissed the taxpayer's contention that the 
"completion date" for purposes of the excise tax was the date the last unit was 
occupied. ld. at 2417, 380 N.E.2d at 650-5l. 
19 ld. at 2417, 380 N.E.2d at 650. 
20 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 149, 384 N.E.2d 124l. 
21 C.L. c. 59, § 5, d. forty-fourth. 
22 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 150, 384 N.E.2d at 124l. 
23 ld. at 151, 384 N.E.2d at 1242. 
24 C.L. c. 59, § 5, cl. forty-fourth. As a manufacturing corporation, the taxpayer 
paid no local taxes on its machinery and equipment. See C.L. c. c. 59, § 5, d. 
sixteenth. 
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industrial waste in order to qualify for the exemption.25 Finding that 
the building in question had as its dominant purpose the manufacture 
of metal castings, the Board denied the exemption.26 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Board's interpreta-
tion of the statute as a "reasonable reading" of the statute.27 The Court 
nevertheless expressed concern that the Board's reading of the statute 
tended to reduce the incentive to build multi-purpose structures whose 
overall effect would be to reduce air pollution.28 Thus, the Court left 
undisturbed an interpretation which will allow only single purpose fa-
cilities to qualify for the exemption. 29 
In a third Survey year decision, Community Development Company 
of Gardner v. Assessors of Gardner,30 the Supreme Judicial Court deter-
mined what estimated annual income figure should be used in assessing 
local real estate taxes for section 236 31 low income housing projects. 
Under section 236 of the National Housing Act, the federal government 
closely controls the financial operation of a low income housing project, 
including the rents charged.32 Federal regulations require the owner 
to establish two monthly rental rates for each unit. The first rate, "basic 
monthly rental," established by a formula assuming a mortgage cost of 
one percent per annum, is the rate at which qualifying tenants pay.sa 
The second is the "fair market monthly rental" value, which is deter-
mined on the basis of the actual mortgage rate.34 It does not reflect 
the amount a unit could bring on the open market. The difference be-
tween these rental rates is paid to the owner's mortgagee, and any rents 
collected by the owner in excess of the subsidized level must be remitted 
to the federal government.35 The owner may not charge in excess of 
the "fair market" rentaP6 
25 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 152, 384 N.E.2d at 1243. 
26 Id. at 153, 384 N.E.2d at 1243. 
27 Id. at 154, 384 N .E.2d at 1243. 
28 Id. at 154-55, 384 N.E.2d at 1243-44. 
29 It seems possible, and not unreasonable, to read the statute as exempting 
structures that were constructed, in whole or in part, for the desired environmental 
effect. The Board held, however, that the use of the word "purpose" was not 
related to the taxpayer's motivation for constructing the building. Similarly the 
phrase "in whole or in part" was found by the Board not to refer to "the purpose" 
but rather the use of the property itself. Id. at 153-54, 384 N.E.2d at 1243. 
30 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 443, 385 N.E.2d 1376. 
31 Section 236 of the National Housing Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1715xz-1 (1976) [here-
inafter cited as Section 236]. . 
S2 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 445, 385 N.E.2d at 1377 (citing 24 C.F.R. § 236.55 
(1978) ). 
3a Id. 
34 Id. at 445, 385 N.E.2d at 1377-78. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 446, 385 N.E.2d at 1378. 
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The controversy in Community Development Company of Gardner 
involved the determination of fair cash value of the property for pur-
poses of the local real estate tax.37 The local assessors adopted the 
"fair market" rental value of the property as the proper determinant. 
The Appellate Tax Board rejected the assessors' argument that the 
higher fair rental value should be used because the federal interest pay-
ments to the owner's mortgage were a "subsidy" to the owner.38 The 
Board nevertheless adopted the higher fair rental value on the theory 
that such figures represented rentals that could be obtained "were it not 
for the federal regulations." 39 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court reversed the determination 
of the Appellate Tax Board. It accepted the taxpayer's argument that 
the application of the federal regulations could not be ignored in deter-
mining the value of the property.40 The Court reasoned that this result 
was compelled by the federal law barring the owner from retaining 
rents in excess of the subsidized level and charging "the fair rental 
value" to low income families. 41 The Court emphasized the "unique 
status" of these projects whose value it found to be "inherently ambig-
uous." 42 The Court therefore held that, in light of the restricted 
income factor, assessment at the higher "fair rental value" was im-
proper.43 
Although, as the Court intimated, these types of housing projects, and 
hence the law of the case, may be sui generis, the principles underlying 
this decision may be applicable to other taxpayers who seek abatements 
for property whose income or use is restricted by law. For example, 
rent controlled properties, taxpayers might argue, should be assessed 
solely by means of capitalizing the permitted annual income. Similarly, 
if a zoning requirement or some municipal by-law restricts the use of 
the property to be valued, the determination of fair value should reflect 
the limited utility of the property. This decision thus may presage a 
new approach to valuation of certain properties. 
37 Id. Both parties stipulated toa capitalization rate of 18.04 percent. Id. at 
446 n.8, 385 N.E.2d at 1378 n.8. 
38 Id. at 446 n.9, 385 N.E.2d at 1378 n.9. See also Morville House, Inc. v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 369 Mass. 928,344 N.E.2d 878 (1976) (interest 
subsidies held not to be income for Massachusetts taxation). 
39 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 446, 385 N.E.2d at 1378. 
40 Id. at 446-47, 385 N.E.2d at 1378. 
41 Id. at 447, 385 N.E.2d at 1378. 
42 Id. (quoting G. PETERSON, A. SOLOMON, H. MADJID, & W. APGAR JR., PROPERTY 
TAXES, HOUSING AND THE CITIES, at 73 (1973)). 
43 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 448-49, 385 N.E.2d at 1378. 
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In Tregor v. Assessors of Boston 44 the Supreme Judicial Court re-
viewed the difficult issue of remedies available to a taxpayer who has 
been the victim of "disproportionate assessment." The Massachusetts 
constitution, prior to adoption of the November 1978 amendment per-
mitting classification of property by use,45 explicitly required that one 
class of property be subject to tax on the same basis and at the same 
rate applicable to any other class or classes of property.46 Consequently, 
under the prior constitutional tax provision, all property in the common-
wealth whether commercial, industrial, or otherwise, had to be valued 
at full and fair cash value and had to be subject to a rate of tax uni-
formly applied to all classes of property.47 
Chapter 59 of the General Laws, as then in effect, provided that a 
taxpayer who is taxed "at more than his just proportion, or upon an 
assessment of any of his property in excess of its fair cash value . . . ., 
is entitled to a "reasonable abatement . . . ." 48 Historically, however, 
the sole question in abatement cases had been whether the property 
was valued at more than its fair cash value and not whether it had been 
valued at more or less than similar property.49 This long standing rule 
was flatly abandoned in 1965 in ShopperS World, Inc. v. Assessors of 
Framingham. 50 In Shoppers' World, the Supreme Judicial Court held 
that if a taxpayer proved intentional disproportionate assessment, he 
should receive "an abatement ... which will make the taxpayer's assess-
ment proportional to other assessments . . . ." 51 In a much-cited foot-
note, however, the Shoppers World Court also added that 
"[iJf ... it should be shown that several different percentages of 
full, fair cash value were employed in valuing different classes of 
property, ... [logically there should be] reduction of the assessment 
of a taxpayer against whom there had been discrimination so that 
such taxpayer's assessment would be proportional to the assessments 
of the class of property valued at the lowest percentage of fair cash 
value. 52 
44 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 770, 387 N.E.2d 538 (1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 841 
( 1980). 
45 MASS. CONST. amend. CXII; C.L. c. 59A, added by Acts of 1978, c. 580, § 8. 
For a discussion of this amendment see § 8 infra. 
46 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. IV, prior to amendment by MASS. CONST. 
amend. CXII. 
47 Id. See also Shoppers' World, Inc. v. Assessors of Framingham, 348 Mass. 
366,203 N.E.2d 811 (1965). 
48 C.L. c. 59, § 59, prior to amendment by Acts of 1978, c. 580, § 33. 
49 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 774-75, 387 N.E.2d at 541. 
50 348 Mass. 366, 203 N.E.2d 811 (1965). 
51 Id. at 377, 203 N.E.2d at 820. 
52 Id. at 377 n.1O, 203 N.E.2d at 820 n.10. 
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The Court subsequently adopted this dictum as law in Assessors of 
Weymouth v. Curtis.53 The Curtis Court's adoption of the Shoppers' 
World dictum was curious jurisprudence, however, because Curtis in-
volved only a single level of discrimination, a situation amply covered 
by the Shoppers' World holding. 54 
Tregor squarely presented a situation where the municipal assessment 
practices reBected discrimination at several levels. The sole issue pre-
sented was whether the abatement to be granted should be based upon 
an assessment proportional to the municipal average or whether it 
should be based upon an assessment proportional to the most favored 
class. 55 The taxpayer in Tregor had been granted an abatement by the 
Appellate Tax Board, proportionate to the assessments of the lowest 
valued class of property. 56 In this case, the parties had agreed upon 
the property's value. 57 They also stipulated as to the existence of a 
multi-level disproportionate assessment practice under which single-
family residential property was "the most favored class" of property.58 
The dispute centered solely on the issue of the remedy. 59 The taxpayer 
claimed entitlement to a reduced assessment for his commercial prop-
erty proportional to the assessment of single family residences, the class 
of property valued at the lowest percentage of fair cash value. The 
city, however, claimed that the proper remedy was the reduction of the 
taxpayer's assessment to a level proportional to the average rate of 
assessments of all classes of property. 60 
On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court upheld the Appellate Tax 
Board's decision to grant an abatement based upon the lowest assess-
ment percentage.6t In reaching its decision, the Court without analysis 
relied upon its decision in Curtis as requiring abatement to the average 
for the most favored class.62 Conceding that it would prefer a com-
prehensive remedy to produce uniform assessments at fair cash value, 
the Court recognized that no such remedy could be ordered by the 
53 375 Mass. 493, 378 N.E.2d 655 (1978). 
54 See note 64 infra. 
55 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 770-71, 387 N.E.2d at 539. 
56 ld. at 770, 387 N.E.2d at 539. They agreed to apply the oapitalization of 
income method, using a net income figure of $55,000 and a capitalization rate of 
10%. ld. at 771, 387 N.E.2d 539. The rate of assessment for single-family resi-
dence was 26.8%. The average rate of assessment in Boston was 50.2%. ld. 
67 ld. at 771, 387 N.E.2d at 539. 
58 ld. 
69 ld. at 774, 387 N.E.2d at 540. 
60ld. 
61 ld. at 783, 387 N.E.2d at 544. 
62 ld. See text at note 53 supra. The Court was careful to point out that 
Boston's system of assessment was "in flagrant disregard of constitutional and statu-
tory mandates." ld. at 773, 387 N.E.2d at 540. 
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Appellate Tax Board in an abatement proceeding.63 Therefore, the 
Court concluded that where the taxpayer had made out a prima facie 
case of disproportionate assessment, the Court would allow abatement 
to the average assessment of the most favored class.64 Declining to look 
beyond the stipulation that there was disproportionate assessment, the 
Court upheld the decision of the Appellate Tax Board.65 
The effect of the Tregor decision has been considerably limited by 
the passage of the new classiRcation amendment and its implementing 
legislation. The c,lassiRcation amendment will permit what was previ-
ously constitutionally prohibited-differing assessments for different 
classes of property. It would therefore appear that the remedy ordered 
by the Tregor Court will not be available once assessments based on 
different classes of property are in effect. At that point, a taxpayer's 
remedy will be to seek an abatement of his tax to the average assess-
ment of the class of property to which his property belongs. 
Recalcitrant municipalities continued the use of dilatory tactics de-
signed to forestall their constitutional and statutory duty to value all 
real property at its full and fair cash value.66 In Commonwealth v. 
Town of Andover,67 local assessors of more than a dozen municipalities 
submitted revaluation plans to the Commissioner of Revenue. The 
Commissioner approved the revaluation plans. The municipalities, how-
ever, failed to appropriate funds to carry out the approved plans or any 
other suitable method of achieving one hundred percent evaluation.68 
63 [d. at 777, 387 N.E.2d at 541-42. 
64 [d. at 779-80, 387 N.E.2d at 542-43. "The most favored class" statement in 
Curtis should not have been treated by the Tregor Court as the holding of the 
Curtis case. The Tax Board findings reviewed by the Curtis Court were that real 
property in Weymouth had been generally assessed at 70% of its fair market value 
and that the taxpayer had been a victim of an intentional, discriminatory assessment 
scheme, had been assessed at a higher rate, and was oonsequently entitled to be 
assessed at 70% along with other real estate owners in Weymouth. 375 Mass. 493, 
497, 378 N .E.2d 655, 658 (1978). In other words, the Appellate Tax Board found 
only two classes of property owners, namely the victimized commercial property 
owners and all others. Thus, there was simply no evidence in Curtis that several 
different percentages of full, fair cash value were being utilized in valuing different 
classes of property. Therefore, the holding of Shoppers' World was a proper legal 
base for the Board's decision. The Curtis Court's pronouncement concerning the 
Shoppers' World footnote was itself unnecessary to the decision and hence dicta. 
See also 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 785, 387 N.E.2d at 545 (Wilkins, J., dissenting). 
65 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 783, 387 N.E.2d at 544. 
66 See MASS. CONST. amend. CXII; G.L. c. 59A, added by Acts of 1978, c. 580, 
§ 8. See discussion at § 8 infra. Under the mandate of Town of Sudbury v. 
Commissioner of Corps. & Tax'n, 366 Mass. 558,563,321 N.E.2d 641, 648 (1974), 
municipalities in the commonwealth are required to assess all property at 100% fair 
cash valuation. Such mandate is constitutionally required. See MASS. CoNST. pt. 
II, c. 1, § 1, art. IV. 
67 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1619, 391 N.E.2d 1225. 
68 [d. at 1620, 391 N.E.2d at 1228. 
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The commonwealth filed suit seeking a declaration that the Commis-
sioner of Revenue was empowered to contract with commercial ap-
praisal firms to conduct the appraisals for each recalcitrant municipality. 
It also sought to have the appraisal costs deducted by the state treasurer 
from the state aid that would be otherwise distributed to the particular 
municipalities.G9 
The Supreme Judicial Court held that the Commissioner of Revenue 
had no authOrity, express or implied, to enter into a contract on behalf 
of any municipality.70 Similarly, the Court ruled that the treasurer had 
no authority to deduct any such payments for appraisals from state 
funds otherwise due the city or town. 71 At the same time, however, the 
Court noted that the municipalities, by their refusal to appropriate 
funds, had thwarted the efforts of local assessors to carry out constitu-
tionally mandated duties.72 The Court obst:rved that, pursuant to the 
Court's general equity power, a single justice could formulate appropriate 
relief.73 It suggested that the single justice could fashion an order per-
mitting each municipality to appropriate the necessary funds promptly.74 
Should the local legislative bodies and the assessors fail to "respond 
promptly and fully," the Court would authorize "more drastic re-
lief .... " 75 In such an instance a single justice, the Court suggested, 
"might authorize the Commissioner to contract for revaluation services 
and direct that the cost of the contract be imposed on the city or town, 
perhaps by directing the State Treasurer to withhold funds otherwise 
distributable to the municipality." 76 Thus, although the Court ruled that 
the Commissioner of Revenue could not of his own authority contract 
on behalf of a municipality, it conceded that in view of the special cir-
cumstances of the communities' recalcitrance on the matter of reassess-
ment, the Court, pursuant to its equity powers, would be willing to 
authorize such action by the Commissioner. 
§16.8. Real Estate Taxation-Legislation-Classification Amendment. 
The ratification on November 7, 1978, of the constitutional amendment 1 
permitting the classification of real property for tax purposes has sub-
stantially altered the way property taxes are assessed in the common-
wealth. The amendment modified the prior constitutional mandate that 
69 Id. at 1621, 391 N.E.2d at 1228. 
70 Id. at 1631, 391 N.E.2d at 1232. 
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 1629, 391 N.E.2d at 1231. 
7S Id. 
74 Id. at 1629-30, 391 N.E.2d at 1231. 
75 Id. at 1630, 391 N.E.2d at 1231. 
76Id. 
§16.8. 1 MASS. CaNST. amend. CXII. 
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all real property in the commonwealth, regardless of use, be uniformly 
assessed at full fair cash value for local property taxes.2 As amended, 
the constitution now permits the legislature to classify real property 
"according to its use in no more than four classes and to assess, rate 
and tax such property differently in the classes so established, but propor-
tionately in the same class .... " 3 Thus, while each class may be sub-
ject to different rates of assessment, within each class the rate must 
be uniform.4 
Anticipating ratification in the autumn, in the summer of 1978 the 
legislature had enacted a statute entitled "Classification of Real Prop-
erty." 5 This statute, which was never implemented,6 deSignated four 
classes of real property by usage: residential, commercial, industrial or 
manufacturing, and open space.7 Under this scheme, after the assessors 
determined the full fair cash valuation of all real property not entirely 
exempt from tax, each parcel of land would then be appropriately classi-
fied by use. 8 The statute called for the following ratios to be applied 
to fair cash values of each class: residential, forty percent; commercial, 
fifty percent; industrial, fifty-five percent; and open space property, 
twenty-five percent.9 With the exception of residential property, which 
was subject to an additional exemption of $5000 per parcel, the resulting 
figure represented the property valuations to which the local tax rate 
was applied.10 
Not content with its initial attempts at real property classification, the 
legislature, after obtaining a favorable advisory opinion from the Su-
preme Judicial Court on a similar bill,l1 enacted chapter 797 of the Acts 
2 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. IV. 
3 Id., as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. CXII (hereinafter cited as MASS. 
CONST. pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. IV). 
4Id. 
o Acts of 1978, c. 580. 
6 The statute was repealed by Acts of 1979, c. 797, § 23, which inserted in 
its place C.L. c. 59, § 2A. 
7 Acts of 1978, c. 580. 
8 Id. 
Old. 
10 Id. Chapter 580 was challenged by certain business interests in Associated 
Indus. of Mass., Inc. v. Commissioner of Revenue, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2027, 393 
N.E.2d 812, The plaintiffs claimed chapter 580 to be invalid on the following 
grounds: (1) that the statute, enacted months before ratification, was contingent 
legislation; (2) that, because 100% valuation certification would not be obtained 
by all towns and cities within the same tax year, the act violated the constitution's 
proportionality and equal protection requirements; (3) that the act's utility com-
pany property tax exemption created a de facto unauthorized fifth class of property; 
and (4) that the $5000 residential exemption created an irrational discrimination 
against rent paying tenants. The Court rejected all of the plaintiff's arguments 
and held chapter 580 constitutional. Id. at 2027-28, 393 N.E.2d at 813. 
11 See Opinion of the Justices, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1756, 393 N.E.2d 306. 
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of 1979. This statute repealed the 1978 reclassification measure 12 and 
created a new system of property taxation. IS The new version does 
not mandate specific assessment ratios, thereby permitting substantially 
more Hexibility at the municipal level in terms of the allocation of the 
entire municipal tax burden amongst the various classes of property.14 
As in the 1978 act, all real property in a municipality is classified by use 
into four categories, namely residential, open space, commercial, and 
manufacturing or industrial.15 All property regardless of classification 
must be valued at full and fair value.16 Another feature of the earlier 
version preserved in the 1979 classification act is that classification by 
use cannot be implemented by a municipality until the Commissioner 
of Revenue has certified that all property in the city or town has been 
assessed at full fair values.17 The act grants the Commissioner of Rev-
enue broad supervisory and rule-making authority over all assessors and 
assessing practices in the state. The Commissioner has the duty of 
enforcing all laws relating to valuation, classification, and assessment 
ratios. IS Unlike the 1978 act, which applied Hat statewide assessment 
ratios to each class of property prior to the application of the uniform 
municipal tax rate, the new act permits each municipality to ta?C each 
class of property at different rates.10 
Local assessors, under Department of Revenue guidelines, biennially 
determine which portion of the entire municipal property tax burden is 
to be borne by each class of real property and all personal property.20 
The selection of two variables, namely the residential factor and the 
open space variable, is the means permitting local discretion in allocating 
the tax burden among the classes of property. Using the taxable values 
of the individual municipality, the Commissioner of Revenue computes 
a minimum "residential factor," which must fall between 65 percent and 
12 Acts of 1979, c. 797, § 23. This repeal was voided by § 46 of the repealing 
act. The statute was subsequently repealed by Acts of 1980, c. 261, § 16. 
lS See generally Acts of 1979, c. 797. See also G.L. c. 59, § 2A, added by Acts 
of 1979, c. 797, § 11. 
14 ld., § 2A(b). 
111 ld. 
161d. 
17 ld., § 2A(c). Another precondition is that a majority of the assessors must 
be qualified to classify its property. ld. As of March 31, 1980, 129 of the 351 
municipalities in the commonwealth were notified by the Department of Revenue, 
Bureau of Local Assessment, that they were, or coUld be with some adjustments, 
eligible to implement classification. 
1S See G.L. c. 58, §§ 1, lA, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 797, § 3; G.L. c. 
58, § 3, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 797, § 4; G.L. c. 58, §§ 4, 4A, 4B, 4C, 
as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 797, § 5; G.L. c. 58, § 6, as amended by Acts of 
1979, c. 797, § 7. 
19 G.L. c. 40, § 56, added by Acts of 1979, c. 197, § 1. 
2°ld. 
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100 percent.21 For each community this figure represents the maximum 
discount or variation from strict proportionality allowed to residential 
property. The board of selectmen or mayor then adopts a residential 
factor that is not less than the minimum set by the Commissioner.22 
Based upon this residential factor, the assessors next determine the dis-
count permitted open space land and then compute the allocable tax 
burden of each class.23 The duly determined percentages then apply 
for the following two fiscal years. 24 
In order to understand how the new allocation process functions, one 
must distinguish between property which is included in each class for 
the initial class allocation and property which is in fact taxable within 
each class. When property is included in a class for allocation purposes 
but later exempted from tax for any reason, the share of the total class 
burden which the other taxable property within such class will bear 
necessarily will be increased. The terminology of the pertinent statutes 
can be confusing in this regard. Section 2A of chapter 59 requires the 
classification of real property, regardless of whether such property is 
exempt from taxation under other provisions of law. 25 Section 38 of 
chapter 59, concerning valuation as opposed to classification, requires 
the assessors to "make a fair cash valuation of all estate, real and per-
sonal, subject to taxation . .. " in the municipality.26 The answer to 
whether nontaxable property is valued for class allocation purposes lies 
in distinguishing between property which "is not subject to taxation" 
and property which as a general matter is subject to taxation but which 
for some reason, often because of the owner's status, is exempt from 
taxation. The former is excluded in determining the value of each class 
and the latter is included in such determination. "Exemptions" there-
fore do not reduce the overall class burden. Instead, because they are 
implemented within the class itself, they consequently increase the 
taxable property's relative share of the entire class tax burden.27 For 
example, "recreational land," which is subject to taxation under chapter 
BIB but which may be exempt from taxation,28 should be valued for 
21 C.L. c. 58, § 1A. In setting the minimum residential factor, the Commis-
sioner is guided by the statutory rule that no class of real or personal property 
shall bear a percentage of the total tax levy in excess of 150% of its respective 
proportion of all taxable property in the municipality. Id. 
22 C.L. c. 40, § 56. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 C.L. c. 59, § 2A(b). 
26 C.L. c. 59, § 38 (emphasis added). 
27 See, e.g., C.L. c. 59, § 2A (b). The definition of residential class I property 
makes clear that although valued for allocation purposes, some residential property 
may be exempt from taxation under other provisions of law. 
28 See C.L. c. 59, § 5, forty-eighth. 
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purposes of determining the commercial class allocation. Unfortunately, 
one cannot rely on statutory labels. Property stated to be "exempt" in 
fact may be "not subject to taxation." For example, property owned 
and used for governmental purposes is declared to be "exempt" 29 when 
in fact it is "not subject to taxation." Consequently, its value should 
not be included as part of commercial class property 30 for purposes of 
determining the class allocations. Thus, the class size resulting from 
initial classification may differ significantly from the size of the class 
actually bearing the burden of taxation.31 
The local authorities allocate the tax burden by selecting a residential 
factor and an open space variable.32 The latter factor, which discounts 
the value of open space land, may be any percentage, subject only to 
a statutory minimum equal to 85 percent of the residential factor.33 
The percentages of the classes are determined by reference to the resi-
dential factor.34 Since raising the residential factor increases the pro-
portionate burden which residential property in the municipality bears, 
communities wishing to minimize the tax burden of its residential prop-
erty owners should opt for the minimum residential factor. Such re-
allocation of the tax burden is not mandatory, however. The selection 
of a residential factor of 100 percent and an open space variable of 100 
percent will ensure that each class of real property and personal prop-
erty bears its strict proportionate share. 
Once the variables of the formula have been determined, the second 
step in the tax allocation process involves a series of interdependent 
arithmetic computations each based in part on class to community 
value ratios.35 It is evident that residen:tial and open space property 
may be favored at the expense of both the other two classes of real 
property and the personal property. It is also clear that regardless of 
the degree of discrimination in favor of residential and open space 
29 C.L. c. 59, § 5, first. 
30 C.L. c. 59, § 2A (b) (commercial property includes property used for gov-
ernmental and other non-profit purposes). 
31 Inclusion of certain exempt property in the initial allocation process may be 
quite unpopular. For instance, certain urban redevelopment property is subject to 
taxation but is exempt from the property tax if subject to the urban development 
excise. See C.L. c. 59, § 5, forty-seventh. Thus, while this property should be 
included in the appropriate class for determining class allocations, it will not in 
fact bear any of the burden of paying the tax. 
32 C.L. c. 40, § 56. 
33 Id. This legislation specifically requires the local authorities to select a resi-
dential factor. There is no similar specific language concerning selection of the 
open space variable other than the general language requiring the local authorities 
to "deternrlne the percentages of the local tax levy to be borne by each class of 
real property .... " Id. 
34 See id. 
35 For details of the computation see C.L. c. 40, § 5b. 
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property the rates for commercial, industrial, and personal property will, 
subject to exemptions within each class, always tend to be the same 
in the first year following the biennial allocation. In other words, that 
part of the municipal tax burden which is carved away from the resi-
dential and open space classes by means of the two variables is propor-
tionately assumed by the other three classes. Although the percentage 
burden of each class remains the same for two years, increases or de-
creases in "taxable" values within the classes occurring in the first year 
following the percentile allocations may cause the rates within each 
class to vary in the second year. 
Proportionality by class does not mean that an individual real prop-
erty owner within a class will not bear more than his pre-classification 
constitutionally required share. The total value of each class for pur-
poses of the allocation of the tax burden may include some property 
which is exempt from taxation. Thus, if one class contains any sig-
nificant amount of exempt property, the tax burden of an individual 
parcel within that class will be proportionate to the burden of the other 
taxable realty in its class. It will not, however, be proportionate in 
the preclassification community-wide sense. Since the percentage al-
location to each class is prospectively determined for a two-year period, 
destruction in the first year of valuable property within a class will 
require, in the second year, the other property owners within the class 
to assume proportionately that share of the tax burden previously borne 
by destroyed property. In either of these two situations, where there 
is either a huge loss in value within a class after the biennial allocation 
or extraordinarily large exemptions within a class, a class may theoreti-
cally bear more than the permissible 150 percent of the fair value of 
the taxable property in such class divided by the fair value of all tax-
able property in the community. 
With minor exceptions, the classification act's definitions of the classes 
of property are straightforward. The definitions of the two favored 
classes of property, residential and open space, however, pose some 
questions. Residential property is defined as 
property used or held for human habitation containing one or more 
dwelling units including rooming houses with facilities designed 
and used for living, sleeping, cooking and eating on a non-transient 
basis. Such property includes accessory land, buildings or improve-
ments incidental to such habitation and used exclusively by the 
residents of the property or their guests. Such property shall not 
include a hotel or motel. Such property may be exempt from taxa-
tion under other provisions of law.36 
36 C.L. c. 59, § 2A. Undoubtedly, the meaning of "non-resident" will be of 
considerable interest to owners of boarding houses and vacation property. 
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The inclusion of "accessory" land in the definition of residential property 
will raise a few questions, particularly for condominium owners. Al-
though each condominium unit is treated as an individual "parcel" of 
real estate and will be classified as residential,87 the resident or residents 
of such individual parcel will not be the exclusive users of the common 
areas which are owned and used by all the owners of all the different 
individual parcels. The same issue arises where two adjoining free 
standing homes share a common driveway. Such common areas can-
not be accessory property entitled to residential classification unless the 
exclusive use provision is read to apply to more than one property owner. 
This problem is not merely a semantic one. Since all property within 
a single parcel will not necessarily be classified within a single class, 
if different uses are made of different segments of the entire property, 
each portion must be separately valued and classified. Thus, an owner 
may have "recreational" land taxed under chapter 61B, "residential" prop-
erty, and "commercial" property in what the owner considers a single 
piece of property.- As a practical matter local assessors may not carve 
away the common driveway for different classification from the two 
contiguous "residential" properties. Although the parking lot of a large 
apartment complex is unquestionably "accessory land or improvements" 
while the property is held for rental, it may not continue to be entitled 
to the residential classification once the complex is converted to con-
dominium status. 
as 
The second favored class of property is open space land. It is defined 
land which is not otherwise classified and which is not taxable under 
the provisions of chapter sixty-one or sixty-one A, or taxable under 
a permanent conservation restriction or lands otherwise taxed for 
recreational purposes under other provisions of law, and which land 
is not held for the production of income but is maintained in an 
open or natural condition and which contributes Significantly to the 
benefit and enjoyment of the public.88 
This definition is quite similar to the definition of "recreational" land 
qualifying for a limited exemption from real property taxes.89 One 
significant difference, however, is that "open space" land does not in-
clude land held for the production of income. Thus, the owner of a 
commercial ski resort may opt for recreational classification with its 
advantages and attendant risks. If however, the owner should decide 
to leave the property on the tax rolls, it will be classified as "commercial" 
87 See C.L. c. 59, § 5C (eligibility for optional residential exemption). 
38 C.L. c. 59, § 2A(b). 
89 See generaUy C.L. c. 61B, § 1. 
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property notwithstanding its beautiful and natural condition and rec-
reational benefit to the public. The requirement of significant contribu-
tion to the benefit and enjoyment of the public raises the issue of public 
access to private property. There is no question that there is public 
benefit derived from the preservation of so-called "open space land" in 
its open or natural state. The Massachusetts constitution states that 
conservation of such lands in their natural state is a "public purpose." 40 
The recreational use statute 41 provides that certain classes of land are 
eligible for the "recreational land" classification if the property owner 
permits the public generally or the members of a non-profit organization 
to have access to the property. Arguably, the public can enjoy prop-
erty without direct access to it. Given the premise that enjoyment of 
the land does not require access to the land and the lack of the express 
requirement of public access to open space land, it may be that the 
legislature did not intend that public access be a prerequisite for open 
space classification. 
The definitions of commercial and industrial property are reasonably 
straightforward. Commercial property is defined as 
property used or held for use for business purposes and not spe-
cifically includible in another class, including but not limited to 
any commercial, business, retail, trade, service, recreational, agri-
cultural, artistic, sporting, fraternal, governmental, educational, med-
ical or religiOUS enterprise, for non-profit purposes. Such property 
may be expressly exempt from taxation under other provisions of 
this chapter.42 
Industrial property is defined as 
property used or held for use for manufacturing, milling, converting, 
producing, processing or fabricating materials; the extraction or 
processing of materials unserviceable in their natural state to create 
commercial products or materials; the mechanical, chemical or elec-
tronic transformation of property into new products and any use that 
is incidental to or an integral part of such use, whether for profit or 
non-profit purposes; and property used or held for uses for the stor-
age, transmitting and generating of utilities regulated by the depart-
ment of public utilities. Such property may be exempt from taxa-
tion under other provisions of law.43 
The legislature submitted a bill 44 similar to the one enacted to the 
Supreme Judicial Court for an advisory opinion as to its constitutional-
40 MASS. CoNST. amend. XLIX. 
41 C.L. c. 6lB, § 1. 
42 C.L. c. 59, 2A(b). 
43 ld. 
44 H.R. 6371 (1979) (hereinafter cited as H.R. 6371). 
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ity.45 The differences between the bill considered and the one enacted 
are more of degree than of substance. First, the bill considered by the 
Court permitted a city or town to adopt a residential factor between 
seventy and one hundred percent.46 Second, the bill submitted con-
tained no discretionary variable for open space property, but instead 
utilized within the open space percentage formula a specific discount 
factor of 62 percent multiplied by the residential factor.47 Notwith-
standing these differences, the major conceptual feature of each bill is 
the discretion given municipalities to allocate the property tax burden 
among the various classes of property.48 Since the advisory opinion 
dealt with the constitutionality of such concept as opposed to particular 
details of the proposed legislation,49 the Court's holding is certainly 
relevant and probably dispositive of the constitutional questions raised 
by the enactment of the 1979 classification statute. 
In its advisory opinion, the Supreme Judicial Court first addressed the 
constitutional question of delegation inherent in permitting local mu-
nicipalities to set the tax rates for different classes of property. Home 
rule concepts notwithstanding, the legislature has always possessed the 
ultimate power to assess property taxes in the commonwealth.50 His-
torically, muniCipalities have always been delegated the power to assess 
property and to set tax rates.51 The Court, while identifying no specific 
authority for such delegation, noted that this delegation has always been 
assumed proper and, as a practical matter, necessary because of the 
varying revenue needs of the individual municipalities across the state.52 
The Court held that such delegation to the municipalities is constitution-
ally permitted.53 The second question addressed by the Court focused 
on whether the constitutional mandate of proportionality within each 
class of property required proportionate rates for each class throughout 
the commonwealth.54 The Court found "no reason to believe that pro-
portionality under the amendment of Article 4 was intended to require 
that municipal tax rates be uniform statewide . . . ." 55 It concluded 
45 Opinion of the Justices, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1756,393 N.E.2d 306 (1979). 
46 H.R. 6371, § 1. 
47 Id. 
48 See Opinion of the Justices, 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1760, 1764, 393 N.E.2d 
at 308, 311. 
49 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1764 n.9, 393 N.E.2dat 310 n.9. 
50 MASS. CONST. pt. 2, c. 1, § 1, art. IV. 
51 1979 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1765, 393 N.E.2d at 310. 
52Id. 
53 Id. at 1767, 393 N.E.2d at 311. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 1769, 393 N .E.2d at 312. The constitutional principle of proportional-
ity under article 4 has always been "understood to mean that municipal tax rates 
must be uniform within each municipality, not that they must be uniform across 
the Commonwealth." Id. at 1768, 393 N.E.2d at 311. 
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that the constitution requires proportionality in each class only within 
a single municipality.56 
§16.9. Real Estate Taxation-Legislation-Recreational Land. At 
the same time the classification amendment was ratified, the voters also 
ratified a constitutional amendment adding "wild" land, land retained 
in its natural state, and land used for recreation, to the class of forest 
lands which could benefit from special legislative treatment for property 
tax purposes.1 The amendment charges the legislature with the duty 
of prescribing such methods of taxation as will "develop and conserve" 
natural resources and "the environmental benefits of recreational lands 
within the Commonwealth." 2 Pursuant to the amendment, the legisla-
ture enacted chapter 713 of the Acts of 1979, codified as chapter 61B, 
to provide for the classification and taxation of recreational land in the 
commonwealth. 3 Only land comprising a minimum of five acres and 
satisfying one of three alternative use and environmental definitions or 
limitations is eligible for recreational classification.4 First, land is 
eligible if it is "retained in substantially a natural, wild, or open condi-
tion. . . ." 5 A second category of qualifying land is land which is 
landscaped in a way so "as to allow to a significant extent the preserva-
tion of wildlife and other natural resources . . . ." 6 Finally, land 
"devoted primarily to recreational use" and which "is available to the 
general public or to members of a non-profit organization ... " will 
qualify, provided there is no material interference "with the environ-
mental benefits which are derived from said land .... " 7 "Recreational 
56 ld. at 1769, 393 N .E.2d at 312. The constitutionality of c. 797 of the Acts 
of 1979 was upheld in Keniston v. Assessors of Boston, 1980 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1485, 
1486, 407 N.E.2d 1275, 1276. 
§16.9. 1 MASS. CONST. amend. XLI, as amended by MASS. CONST. amend. CX. 
Prior to the 1978 classification amendment, the constitution had already permitted 
the legislature to prescribe special property tax treatment for agricultural and horti-
cultural real estate, MASS. CONST. amend. XCIX, as well as forest lands, MASS. 
CONST. amend. LXI. 
2 MASS. CoNST. amend. XLI, as amended by MASS. CoNST. amend. CX. 
3 C.L. c. 61B, added by Acts of 1979, c. 713 (effective July 1, 1980). Some 
of the chapter 713 provisions were borrowed from the existing provisions of chapter 
61A, respecting agricultural and horticultural lands. Compare the conveyance and 
roll back taxes of new chapter 61B, §§ 7, 8, with the conveyance and roll back 
taxes prescribed by C.L. c. 61A, §§ 12, 13. 
4 C.L. c. 61B, § 1, added by Acts of 1979, c. 713, § 1 [hereinafter cited as 
C.L. c. 61B]. 
51d. 
61d. 
7 ld. The Departrrwnt of Revenue reads this new statute differently. The de-
partment would require first that the five acre parcel be retained either in a "natural 
or wild condition" or in "a landscaped condition." Second, land meeting such state 
or condition requirement must then satisfy one of two use requirements. Either 
the land must allow to a significant extent the preservation of wildlife and other 
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use" for this purpose is expressly limited to "hiking, camping, nature 
study and observation, boating, golfing, horseback riding, hunting, fish-
ing, skiing, swimming, picnicking, private non-commercial Hying, in-
cluding hang gliding, archery and target shooting." S Landowners must 
apply annually to their focal assessors for recreational classification of 
their land.9 
The first definition of qualifying land is straightforward. If the land 
is retained to a substantial degree in a natural, wild, or open condition 
it may qualify. One issue to be clarified through regulations is how 
substantial this retention of such land in its natural, wild, or open state 
must be. In light of the constitutional purpose for such classification, 
it is reasonable to construe the word "substantial" as referring to the 
condition or state of the land rather than the size of the parcel. Since 
the statute utilizes the verb "retained," forested land or stripped or ex-
cavated land that has been transformed or reclaimed by man-made 
means to a more or less natural state will not qualify under this first 
definition. 
The second definition of eligible land does permit recreational classi-
fication for land managed, handled, and modified by man. Its current 
state, however, must be "landscaped." Such landscaping must allow 
the preservation of wildlife and other natural resources to a significant 
or meaningful extent. The legislation lists some examples of natural 
resources whose preservation may qualify land for recreational classifica-
tion.10 Natural resources are protected by the constitution.11 In the 
opinion of the Attorney General, they 
would include at the very least, without limitation: air, water, wet-
lands, rivers, streams, lakes, ponds, coastal, underground and sur-
face waters, Hood plains, seashores, dunes, marine resources, ocean, 
shellfish and inland fisheries, wild birds including song and in-
sectivorous birds, wild mammals and game, sea and fresh water 
natural resources, or, alternatively, the land must be devoted "primarily" to recrea-
tional use. See Department of Revenue, Property Tax Bureau, T.I.R. 80-202 
(March 3, 1980). Notwithstanding any contrary intention on the draftsmen's part, 
it is clear that the statute treats land fitting the recreational use definition as eligible 
for recreational classification without regard to whether such land is retained in 
either a "wild" or a "landscaped" condition. Rules of syntax simply do not support 
the department's view. In addition, the wording of the constitutional amendment 
authOrizing this legislation would seem to support this author's reading of the 
statute. 
S G.L. c. 6lB, § 1. 
9 Id., § 3. 
10 The examples are "ground or surface water resources, clean air, vegetation, 
rare or endangered species, geologiC features, high quality soils, and scenic re-
sources." G.L. c. 6lB, § L 
11 MASS. CONST. amend. XLIX. 
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fish of every description, forests and all uncultivated Bora, together 
with public shade and ornamental trees and shrubs, land, soil and 
soil resources, minerals and natural deposits, agricultural resources, 
open spaces, natural areas, and parks and historic districts or sites.12 
Thus, an historic site located on a landscaped five acre parcel may 
qualify the parcel for recreational classification. 
There is a distinction between the degree of environmental protection 
required for the first two types of land eligible for the recreational land 
classification. The first definition covers land retained in its natural 
or open state to a "substantial" or considerable degree. The second 
refers to land developed by man and requires that natural resources 
be preserved to a "significant" extent. The "significant" or meaningful 
protection standard contained in the second definition of qualifying 
land appears less stringent than the first definition's "substantial" or 
considerable protection. The distinction may reBect a desire to preserve 
to the greatest extent possible land that has remained undisturbed. 
The third definition of land eligible for "recreational" classification, 
unlike the previous two, requires actual recreational use of the land.1s 
Landowners in the commonwealth who have parcels of land well-suited 
for hiking, camping, nature study, and similar qualifying recreational 
uses may take advantage of the "recreational" classification without sur-
rendering more than a modicum of their privacy. The definition does 
not appear to require them to open their entire property to the public. 
Making the property available to the local boy scout troop or similar 
"non-profit organization" should suffice, provided the land remains 
"devoted primarily" to recreational use.14 The statute does not require 
that the qualifying use occur with any frequency or on a minimum 
annual aggregate number of occasions. Moreover, land that is not 
utilized in any Significant manner for anything but the defined recrea-
tional use should meet the "primary devotion" requirement regardless 
of the extent or frequency of use. 
All three definitions of recreational land are silent with regard to the 
commercial nature of the land use. A large parcel containing a coal 
mine, a quarry, or a commercial ski resort but otherwise meeting any 
one of the three statutory definitions would seem to be completely 
eligible for "recreational" classification. In these cases, however, the 
new use classification statute will require the separate classification of 
these non-recreational portions of recreational land.11i 
12 Opinion Att'y Gen. 45. Report of the Attorney Ceneral, at 139-48 (1972-73). 
See also C.L. c. 21, § 1 (Similar definition of natural resources). 
18 C.L. c. 61B, § 1. 
14 See id. 
15 See C.L. c. 59, § 2A. In addition, only land is eligible for recreational classi-
fication. Buildings on recreational sites are fully taxable. C.L. c. 61B, § 10. 
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Although an owner of recreational land pays only about 25 percent 
of the otherwise assessable real estate taxes,16 he remains fully subject 
to assessments for the costs of special municipal service or betterments,17 
Such cost will be assessed to the recreational land only to "such pro 
rata extent" as is attributable either to a direct improvement of "the 
recreational use capability of" the land or to a "personal benefit" to 
the owner of the land.18 The owner may elect to have the special assess-
ment remain suspended while the qualifying use is continued.19 
Although the new statute substantially reduces the normal real estate 
tax for recreational land, it subjects such land to two new special taxes, 
if the qualifying use ceases or if the property is sold for a "non-recrea-
tional" use. These two potentially severe taxes, the "conveyance tax" 
and "roll-back tax" 20 have been adopted with minor revisions from the 
"conveyance" and "roll-back" tax provisions in chapter 61A dealing with 
agricultural lands.21 The conveyance tax applies to recreational lands 
only if the property is sold for another use, or utilized in a non-qualify-
ing manner within the ten-year period running from the first day of 
the fiscal year in which the land was first classified as recreationa1.22 
The rate of tax, either ten percent or five percent, depending on the 
length of initial classification, is applied either to the sales price or to 
the fair market value of the property.23 If within the first five years 
of the proscribed decade the property is sold for another use or its use 
is changed to a non-qualifying use, the tax will be ten percent of the 
sales price or the fair market value of the property.24 If the chronologi-
cally proscribed sale or change in use occurs during the second five 
16 G.L. c. 59, § 5, forty-eighth, added by Acts of 1979, c. 713, § 3. If the 
qualified use ceases, the property may then be subject to the conveyance tax on the 
roll-back tax. G.L. c. 61B, §§ 7, 8. The 1979 legislation inadvertently exempted 
"recreational land" from all taxes other than penalty taxes and the betterments 
taxes. In 1980, this oversight was corrected, and "recreational land" is now to be 
taxed annually at the rate applicable to the commercial class within the taxing 
community. G.L. c. 6IB, § 2, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 261, § 19. 
17 G.L. c. 61B, § 13. 
181d. 
19 ld. Interest on the unpaid assessment must, however, be paid annually. ld. 
20 ld., §§ 7, 8. 
21 See G.L. c. 61A, §§ 12, 13. 
22 G.L. c. 61B, § 7. The tax is rid by the transferor or owner to the mu-
nicipality in which the land is locate. ld. 
23 ld. As initially enacted, the conveyance tax was geared to the length of 
ownership rather than the period of recreational classification. Consequently, land 
classified "recreational" for 5 years would have escaped the conveyance tax if, 
when sold or converted to a non-qualifying use, it should have been owned for 
more than 10 years by the seller or converting owner. This loophole in the con-
veyance tax was closed in 1980. The tax is now pegged strictly to the length of 
classification. G.L. c. 61B, § 7, as amended by Acts of 1980, c. 261, §§ 20, 20A. 
241d. 
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years of initial classification the conveyance tax will be five percent.2l! 
No conveyance tax is payable after the first ten years of such classifica-
tion.w 
The conveyance tax is unusual in that it is assessed against the seller 
on the basis of the buyer's prospective use of the property.27 For this 
reason, the statute will not impose the tax on a seller if the purchaser 
files with the local assessors an affidavit of his intention to buy the 
land for a qualified recreational use.2S A false affidavit or a failure to 
continue a qualifying use will make the buyer liable for the conveyance 
tax which would have been due when he acquired the land.29 
Complementing the conveyance tax is the so-called "roll-back" tax. 
This tax applies to the tax year in which the land loses its recreational 
status and also to each of the preceding nine years during which the 
land was classified as recreational,3° The roll-back tax is applicable 
only to the extent that it exceeds the applicable conveyance tax. In 
such case, the conveyance tax is superseded. Sl The roll-back tax is 
designed to make the municipality whole, i.e., to see that the city or 
town, for each pertinent year within the maximum ten year roll-back 
period, receives the taxes to which it would have been entitled had 
the land been classified and taxed like any other taxable land. Thus, 
a change to a non-recreational use in the eleventh month of the ten 
year period of recreational classification triggers not only a current tax 
but also nine years of retroactive taxes. As an added disincentive, the 
roll-back tax due for each year bears interest over the entire roll-back 
period up to the date of payment.S2 
The roll-back tax is triggered when the qualifying use has ceased. 
Whether the owner had applied that year for recreational classification 
is of no consequence.ss If, however, the qualifying use ceases during 
a year for which no current recreational classification is in effect, roll-
2l! ld. 
WId. 
271d. 
281d. 
29 ld. 
BO C.L. c. 61B, § 8. 
81 ld. 
32 ld. The rate of interest is the same as that due on any delinquent local 
property tax. See C.L. c. 59, § 57. Currently, the rate is 14%, recently increased 
from 10%. C.L. c. 59, § 57, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 503, § 1. This change 
became effective for fiscal years beginning July 1, 1979, and thereafter. The De-
partment of Revenue will apply this new, higher rate over the entire roll-back period. 
See Department of Revenue, Property Tax Bureau, T.I.R. 80-202 (March 3, 1980). 
A more equitable solution, however, would be to construe the roll-back tax interest 
provision as applying the statutory rate in effect for each roll-back year. 
33 C.L. c. 61B, § 8. 
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back taxes will apply to the current year and to those individual years 
within the prior ten year period for which the classification was in 
effect.34 Thus, the owner who anticipates a change of use and hence 
does not apply for recreational classification may pay taxes for eleven 
years. If this owner had applied for current recreational classification 
and then changed the use, he would be subject to a maximum of ten 
years of taxes. 
Land will not be subject to roll-back taxes if it is purchased for any 
"public purpose" by the municipality in which it is located.85 Since 
the conveyance tax is inapplicable after ten years of classification, an 
individual who sells land to the municipality for some public purpose 
after that land had been classified recreational for more than ten years 
avoids a penalty tax completely, regardless of whether a qualifying 
recreational use is contemplated by the acquiring municipality.36 Well-
advised sellers or owners should use such tax factors as a part of their 
price negotiations. 
Although classification as recreational land with the accompanying 
reduction in real estate taxes appears attractive, the potential subsequent 
imposition of either of the penalty taxes should make many eligible 
landowners wary. First, not all disqualifying events triggering the 
penalty taxes are within the owner's control. For example, certain 
climatological events may cause a qualifying recreational use, such as 
skiing, to "materially interfere with the environmental benefits" derived 
from the land,37 thereby subjecting the landowner to a single lump sum 
assessment of ten years taxes. Second, the legislature added another 
restriction in the nature of a restraint on transferability. Recreational 
land cannot be sold or converted for "residential, industrial or commer-
cial use" during the period of its recreational classification without giving 
the local municipality in which the land is situated a right of first re-
fusal,88 The city or town has a ninety day option either to meet the 
bona fide offer, in the case of a proposed sale, or to purchase at the 
appraised fair market value in the case of a conversion.89 This portion 
of the statute requires the giving and recording of appropriate notices, 
84Id. 
35 C.L. c. 59, § 57. If, oowever, the municipality's public purpose encompassed 
any use of the land other than "qualifying recreational' usage, the conveyance tax 
could be assessed. This result would occur whether such acquisition was effected 
by agreement of sale or by eminent domain. See C.L. c. 6IB, § 7. See generaUy, 
C.L. c. 79 (eminent domain). When land is taken by eminent domain, oowever, 
the amount of the applicable conveyance tax is added to the price of the taking. 
C.L. c. 61B, § 7. 
86 Id., §§ 7, 8. 
87 Id., § 1. 
88 Id., § 9. 
89Id. 
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affidavits, and certifications to protect innocent and bona fide trans-
ferees. 4o Although the right of first refusal does not apply to mortgage 
foreclosure sales, the foreclosing party must nevertheless give the re-
quired notices.41 When property is sold in foreclosure, mortgagees 
should specify in their notice of sale whether the property is to be sold 
solely for "recreational" usage. Sale for another use, although possibly 
commanding a higher sales price, may trigger an assessment of the con-
veyance and roll-back taxes. Eligible landowners should weigh these 
possible pitfalls carefully before seeking recreational classification for ' 
their land. 
The assessment and collection procedures for the penalty taxes, with 
some necessary modifications, are similar to the procedures applicable 
to property taxes generally.42 For example, roll-back taxes designed to 
reach back nine or ten years obviously cannot be subject to the short 
period of limitation applicable to property taxes.43 An owner who 
wishes to contest either the applicability or the amount of one of the 
penalty taxes has the usual abatement and appeal remedies to the ap-
pellate tax board.44 One significant difference in the appeal procedure 
is that, unlike the general property tax, no portion of the assessed tax 
need be paid as a condition of appeal to the appellate tax board.411 
The constitutional amendment permitting a recreational classification 
system of taxation does not require that one can be enacted. It re-
quires only that if enacted, any such system must "develop and conserve 
. . . natural resources and the environmental benefits of recreational 
lands within the commonwealth." 46 Although the prospect of reduced 
real estate taxes appears enticing, the potential for a severe penalty tax 
combined with the muniCipal option on the land may discourage some 
landowners from seeking recreational classification. Other taxpayers, 
however, such as owners of country clubs, golf courses, camps, and the 
like will find the recreational classification extremely attractive. The 
40Id. 
41 Id. Assumedly "friendly" mortgage foreclosures, where the debtor and creditor 
appear to act at less than arm's lengths, may not qualify for this exemption. Courts, 
particularly in the area of taxation, are accustomed to ignoring the form of trans-
actions in order to rende.r a decision based on the economic realities of the trans-
action. See, e.g., Helvering v. Elkhorn Coal Co.,' 95 F.2d 732 (4th Cir. 1937) 
(step transaction approach used to defeat claimed tax-free reorganization). 
42 See C.L. c. 61B, § 4 (prooedure similar to omitted property assessments under 
chapte.r 59); Id., § 6 (procedure regarding application); Id., § 7 (collection of 
conveyance tax similar to collection of normal real estate taxes); Id., § 14 (roll-back 
tax assessed like omitted property assessments). 
43 See C.L. c. 6IB, § 14. 
44 Id. 
45 Compare C.L. c. 6IB, § 14, with C.L. c. 59, §§ 59, 64, 65, 65B. 
46 MASS. CoNST. amend. XLI, as amended by MASS. CoNST. amend. CX. 
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penalty taxes should serve this constitutional purpose well. Such taxes 
may discourage some from initially seeking classification, but the desire 
to avoid such severe taxes will surely encourage the continued recrea-
tional usage, even in the face of potential alternative and profitable 
development. 
§16.10. Real Estate Taxation-Legislation-Miscellaneous. During 
the Survey period, two changes were made in the taxation of energy-
related property. Chapter 388 of the Acts of 1978 extended from ten 
to twenty years the exemption from local property taxes for solar and 
wind powered energy systems which provide energy for taxable prop-
erty.I Chapter 367 of the Acts of 1979 created an exemption from 
local property taxes for certain hydroelectric power facilities whose 
construction began after January 1, 1979.2 To qualify for the exemp-
tion the owner of the facility must first agree with the municipality in 
which the facility is located "to make a payment in lieu of taxes which 
shall be at least five percent of its gross income in the preceding calen-
dar year." 3 The exemption is limited to twenty years from the date 
of completion of the facility.4 A utility company seeking this exemption 
undoubtedly will negotiate such an agreement prior to commencing 
construction. The statute does not address how the exemption will 
apply to new utility companies with no previous earnings. 
Other Survey period real estate tax legislation will aid taxpayers who 
believe they have been victims of disproportionate assessment. Chapter 
383 of the Acts of 1979 requires the Commissioner of Revenue to sub-
mit to the legislature a report stating the full cash valuations of all 
property in each municipality, the ratio of assessments in each m.u-
nicipality to full cash values of each class of property, and the ratio 
of total assessed values to total cash values in the particular municipal-
ity.5 In any appeal to the Appellate Tax Board concerning assessed 
valuation of the property, the Commissioner's report on the taxing 
municipality m.ust be admitted in evidence by the Board sua sponte.6 
Such report shall be prima facie evidence of the assessm.ent practices 
of the municipality in question.7 Moreover, the Board may grant an 
abatement on the basis of this evidence, even though that issue has 
not been raised in the pleadings.S Consequently, if a municipality has 
§16.10. 1 G.L. c. 59, § 5, forty-fifth, as amended by Acts of 1978, c. 388 (ap-
proved July 12, 1978, effective ninety days thereafter). 
2 G.L. c. 59, § 5, forty-fifth A, izddea by, Acts of 1979, c. 367. 
3 ld. 
41d. 
5 G.L. C. 58, § lOC, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 383, § 1. 
6 G.L. c. 58A, § 12C, added by Acts of 1979, c. 383, § 3. 
7 ld. 
SId. 
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been guilty of disproportionate assessments, a taxpayer may obtain an 
abatement merely by proving the full cash value of his property. 
A third area of legislative change in the taxation of real estate was 
interest rates. Chapter 503 of the Acts of 1979 increased the interest 
on late payments of local property taxes from ten to fourteen percent 
per annum.9 Similar increases were made in the interest payable in 
connection with the redemption of real estate taken or sold for taxes 
and the interest recoverable by a purchaser or assignee of such real 
estate.10 Each rate has been increased from twelve to sixteen percent 
per annum, eHective for land "purchased or taken under a tax title on 
or after" August 16, 1979.11 
9 G.L. c. 59, § 57, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 503, § 1. 
10 G.L. c. 50, § 62, as amended by Acts of 1979, c. 503, § 2. 
11 Id. 
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